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A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework
of Estate Planning
Mark Glover*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drawing upon the burgeoning field of therapeutic jurisprudence,
this Article analyzes the psychological consequences of estate planning.
This analysis reveals that the preparation and implementation of an estate
plan through the execution of a will and other estate-planning documents
has both therapeutic and antitherapeutic characteristics.1 This analysis
also suggests that the positive and negative psychological consequences
of estate planning can serve as a framework through which to analyze the
law of succession and which can provide fresh perspectives on a diverse
array of estate-planning issues. Because legal scholars have generally
failed to employ therapeutic jurisprudential analysis in the estateplanning context,2 this Article illuminates the field’s analytical relevance
to the study of estate planning and encourages the broad expansion of
therapeutic jurisprudential analysis to other areas of the law of succession.
To illustrate the field’s overlooked analytical potential with respect
to the law of succession, this Article analyzes the therapeutic implications of a set of focused and discrete estate-planning rules, namely the
law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors. This analysis confirms the
viability of therapeutic jurisprudence as an insightful analytical tool with
respect to not only the law governing military wills but also the estateplanning process generally.3 Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that the
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning can ultimately
reveal new areas of reform throughout the law of succession.

* Assistant Professor of Professional Practice and Teaching Fellow, Louisiana State University, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University School of Law, 2008. Special thanks to Professor Robert Sitkoff, who provided guidance
throughout the course of this project.
1. See infra Parts III–IV.
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See, e.g., infra Part V.
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Although legal scholars have not previously analyzed the estateplanning process from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspective,4 the therapeutic potential of preparing for the disposition of one’s property upon
death is both intuitive and familiar. For instance, in his classic novel Moby-Dick, Herman Melville provides a striking example of the psychological consequences of finalizing an estate plan. Not long into Captain
Ahab’s search for the Great White Whale, one of the Pequod’s longboats
is attacked while in pursuit of a pod of sperm whales.5 As Melville’s narrator Ishmael describes: “Then all in one welded commotion came an
invisible push from astern, while forward the boat seemed striking on a
ledge; the sail collapsed and exploded; a gush of scalding vapor shot up
near by; something rolled and tumbled like an earthquake beneath us.”6
Although the sailors safely escape the immediate peril of the vengeful
whale, they are “tossed helter-skelter into the white curdling cream of the
squall.”7 They find themselves “drenched through, and shivering cold,
despairing of ship or boat,”8 and are left adrift throughout the night. Fortunately, as morning dawns, Ishmael and the other stranded sailors catch
sight of their boat and eventually reunite with the Pequod.9
After escaping the “jaws of death,”10 Ishmael reflects upon the perilous life a whaler leads, a life in which “squalls and capsizing in the
water and the consequent bivouacks on the deep [are a] matter[] of common occurrence.”11 With these dangers in mind, Ishmael finds solace in
the preparation of his estate plan. Instead of seeking camaraderie with his
fellow crewmates, retiring to peaceful isolation in his quarters, or partaking in any number of religious rituals, Ishmael first tends to the terms of
his will.12 Upon ensuring that his testamentary wishes are in order, Ishmael describes his satisfaction: “After the ceremony was concluded upon
the present occasion, I felt all the easier; a stone was rolled away from
my heart.”13
Ishmael’s account of his testamentary experience illustrates the inherent therapeutic potential of estate planning.14 Formalizing the intuition

4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK; OR THE WHALE 244 (Penguin Books 2003) (1851).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 245.
9. See id. at 245–47.
10. Id. at 245.
11. Id. at 248.
12. See id. at 248–49.
13. Id. at 249.
14. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death,
55 IOWA L. REV. 376, 382 (1969) (explaining that this “passage from Moby Dick . . . seems to illu-

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154607

2012] A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning 429
underlying Melville’s insight, this Article uses therapeutic jurisprudence,
which is founded on the idea “that the law itself can be seen to function
as a kind of therapist or therapeutic agent,”15 as an analytical tool to more
deeply examine the therapeutic consequences of estate planning. When
viewed within this framework, both negative and positive psychological
consequences of preparing an estate plan are identifiable. For example,
estate planning can impose a negative psychological toll because the
process necessarily involves the recognition that the testator’s life will
end.16 Less frequently acknowledged, however, are the positive psychological consequences of preparing an estate plan. These benefits are perhaps most apparent in the satisfaction that the testator experiences from
knowing that his desired testamentary scheme is legally memorialized
and that his estate will be distributed according to his wishes.17
The normative aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to shape the law
in a way that maximizes its therapeutic potential without undermining
the law’s fundamental purposes.18 This goal is especially relevant to the
law of succession because of the acute psychological consequences and
emotionally charged contexts of estate planning and the ultimate administration of the testator’s estate.19 Recognizing the often-overlooked relevance of therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succession and seeking
to inspire the widespread application of the discipline in the estateplanning context, this Article examines the special rules governing the
will-execution process of soldiers and sailors.20 Because this area of the
law comprises a set of insulated and specialized rules, the application of
therapeutic jurisprudence to the will-execution process of soldiers and

strate [the] point” that “will-preparation actually reduces fear of death and has a constructive or even
therapeutic effect on death anxiety”).
15. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 184, 185 (1997).
16. See Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms—The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Finding, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 778 (1993) (“Many persons are intellectually
aware that estate planning is necessary, but find it emotionally difficult to confront the fragility of
life and health.”); The Limits to a Do-it-Yourself Will, CHANGING TIMES, Nov. 1984, at 82, 84 (explaining that “the first and perhaps biggest hurdle” to executing a will is “acknowledging your own
mortality”).
17. See In re SRC Holding Corp., 364 B.R. 1, 34 (D. Minn. 2007) (explaining that one “benefit” of creating a will is the “peace of mind” that the testator receives from “knowing that his/her
wishes upon death [will] be carried out”); Nancy G. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in
Wills (pt. 1), 43 PRAC. LAW. 33, 33 (1997) (“[T]he main reason for having a will . . . is the peace of
mind that comes from knowing that their assets will be distributed the way they want them to be
distributed.”).
18. See Winick, supra note 15, at 184.
19. See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part V.
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sailors clearly illustrates the unique perspective that this Article’s
framework can contribute to the analysis of the law of succession.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides an introduction
to therapeutic jurisprudence. Parts III through V then apply therapeutic
jurisprudence to the process of estate planning. Specifically, Part III
identifies the antitherapeutic consequences of preparing an estate plan,
and Part IV examines the positive psychological aspects of the estateplanning process. Finally, Part V uses the therapeutic jurisprudential
framework of estate planning that is developed in Parts III and IV to analyze a set of discrete estate-planning rules, namely the special rules governing the execution of wills by soldiers and sailors. The analysis of the
law governing this focused context illustrates how the therapeutic jurisprudential framework can serve as an analytical tool for a broad spectrum of legal rules governing the estate-planning process and the law of
succession.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
A. The Emergence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence
In recent years, therapeutic jurisprudence has emerged as a new
lens through which to view and analyze the law. This analysis “focuses
on the law’s impact on emotional life and on psychological wellbeing.”21 As Professor David Wexler explains, the psychological effect
of the law “has traditionally been ignored . . . or regarded as something
apart from the law and its concern,”22 but therapeutic jurisprudence “humaniz[es] the law” and inquires “whether the law can be made or applied
in a more therapeutic way.”23 Professor Bruce Winick, who, along with
Wexler, is a founder of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, explains
further that “[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent.”24
Since therapeutic jurisprudence emerged from mental-health-law
scholarship roughly twenty years ago,25 scholars have used its framework
to analyze numerous areas of the law, including various facets of crimi-


21. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125,
125 (2000).
22. David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353, 356 (2004).
23. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 125.
24. See Winick, supra note 15, at 185.
25. See Marilyn McMahon & David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and
Applications in Australia and New Zealand, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1 (2003); Winick,
supra note 15, at 184.
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nal and family law.26 The scope of therapeutic jurisprudence continues to
expand, and its proponents suggest that its framework is relevant to the
analysis of all areas of law.27 Indeed, proponents urge the extension of
therapeutic jurisprudence beyond the realms of academia and law reform,
and suggest that therapeutic jurisprudence should be a part of the traditional law school curriculum, the daily practice of law, and the legal culture generally.28
B. The Mechanics of Therapeutic Jurisprudence
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis has two components. First,
such analysis begins with the positive task of identifying the therapeutic
and antitherapeutic consequences of the law.29 Second, the normative
goal of therapeutic jurisprudence is to shape the law to maximize its therapeutic qualities and minimize its negative psychological consequences.30 This second component of the analysis involves proposing
reforms of the legal system that will increase the law’s overall therapeutic potential. Such proposals can include reforms of substantive doctrines, procedural rules, and the roles of various actors within the legal
process (e.g., lawyers and judges).31
Therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledges, however, that other factors warrant consideration in the debate over a particular law’s substance

26. See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) (explaining that therapeutic jurisprudence has “spread into
many . . . areas,” such as “sentencing and probation agreements, workers’ compensation law, sexual
orientation law, disability law, fault-based tort compensation schemes, domestic violence, crime
victims, mandatory child abuse reporting, contract law, and family law”).
27. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Rediscovering Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Overlooked Areas of
the Law—How Exposing Its Presence in the Environmental Justice Movement Can Legitimize the
Paradigm and Make the Case for Its Inclusion into All Aspects of Legal Education and the Practice
of Law, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 215, 218 (2008).
28. See Dennis P. Stolle, Introduction to PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xv, xvii
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
29. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 125–26.
30. See Jason Schultz, Can Women Judges Help Make Civil Sexual Assault Trials More Therapeutic?, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 54 (“The goals of therapeutic jurisprudence analysis vary by
project and protagonist, but generally, most advocates . . . attempt to evaluate and redesign legal
systems so as to provide the participants with the most positive experience . . . .”).
31. See Wexler, supra note 21, at 126; see also Murry Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 711, 713 (1993) (using therapeutic jurisprudence to examine “the impact of the mandate to
report suspected child maltreatment on the psychotherapy relationship”); Jennifer Marie Sanchez,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Due Process in the Juvenile Parole Revocation Process: An Arizona
Illustration, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 111, 112 (2005) (exploring “the use of [therapeutic jurisprudence] principles to reform the parole revocation process of the Arizona Department of Juvenile
Corrections”); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 279, 283 (1994) (using therapeutic jurisprudence to analyze “the role of the judge” in
criminal courts).
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and application.32 In fact, “Wexler and Winick have repeatedly emphasized that therapeutic jurisprudence does not dictate the more therapeutic
outcome.”33 Instead, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that therapeutic
consequences should be evaluated alongside other considerations when
analyzing the costs and benefits of the law. Accordingly, the normative
foundation of therapeutic jurisprudence is not that therapeutic consequences should be elevated to such an extent that other considerations
are ignored, but instead is that, all else being equal, the law should be
shaped to maximize its therapeutic potential.
C. Therapeutic Jurisprudential Analysis of the Law of Succession
Despite therapeutic jurisprudence’s broad expansion and the intuitiveness of estate planning’s therapeutic potentialwhich Melville recognized more than a century and a half agothe application of therapeutic jurisprudence to the study of the law of succession has been limited.34
This is true even though maximizing the law’s therapeutic potential in
the context of succession is a prudent objective given the emotionally
charged nature of the estate-planning and probate processes.35 Nonetheless, limited examples of the application of therapeutic jurisprudence to
the law of succession can be found.36
For example, one commentator has examined the law governing the
personal representative who supervises the distribution of the testator’s
estate. The author began the analysis by identifying the therapeutic and
antitherapeutic effects of the personal representative’s actions on the testator’s family.37 Based on this therapeutic jurisprudential analysis, the
author proposed the implementation of a mediation system to the probate
process, which she argued would reduce some of the “bitter feelings”

32. See Schultz, supra note 30, at 54 (listing other factors, such as “constitutionality, individual
autonomy, integrity of the fact-finding process, and community safety”).
33. Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 211 (1995); see also, David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 759, 762 (1993).
34. See Patricia Monroe Wisnom, Note, Probate Law and Mediation: A Therapeutic Perspective, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1345, 1354 (1995).
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547, 560–62
(2002–2003) (providing a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of testamentary capacity); Dara Green,
Note & Comment, Antemortem Probate: A Mediation Model, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 663, 680
(1999); Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1345.
37. See Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1356–57 (explaining that “the laws . . . set forth in the Arizona probate code regarding the duties of the personal representative . . . may be considered therapeutic” because “they set forth guidelines that . . . generally result in timely and accurate distributions in accordance with the wishes of the decedent”).
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experienced “at the closure of difficult estates.”38 This study of the personal representative’s role in the probate process provides a rare example
of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of the law of succession.
In addition to the few explicit applications of therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succession, some legal scholars have examined the
psychological consequences of estate planning and will-execution within
a less structured framework.39 The work of Professor Thomas Shaffer is
the most comprehensive of this scholarship. Although Shaffer does not
expressly frame his work within a therapeutic jurisprudential context, his
scholarship contains many of the hallmarks of the discipline. For example, Shaffer has examined the psychological consequences of the testator’s confrontation with death and ultimately suggested ways that the
estate-planning attorney can more effectively address the negative psychological consequences of the testamentary experience.40 Supplementing Shaffer’s scholarly analysis and adding to the sparse literature that
explicitly applies therapeutic jurisprudence to the law of succession, this
Article examines the estate-planning process within a therapeutic jurisprudential framework.
III. ANTITHERAPEUTIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE PLANNING
The first step of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis is to identify
the negative and positive psychological consequences of the law.41 This
process facilitates the second step of the analysis by providing a framework through which to evaluate the therapeutic impact of potential law
reforms.42 When applied to the process of estate planning, the first step
of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that the exercise of testamentary power has both antitherapeutic and therapeutic consequences.
Indeed, in contrast to Ishmael, who seemingly experienced only the therapeutic effects of estate planning,43 some may experience negative psychological consequences from the act of preparing and implementing a
testamentary scheme.

38. Id. at 1362.
39. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony—History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1988). Other scholars have merely mentioned the psychological consequences of various aspects of the law of succession in passing. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch,
Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031,
1047 (2004) (“Executing a will can yield obvious psychic benefits . . . .”).
40. See generally Shaffer, supra note 14; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young
Family Clients and the Psychology of Testation, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1968).
41. See supra Part II.B.
42. See supra Part II.B.
43. See MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 249.
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A. Death Anxiety
The preparation and implementation of an estate plan can be psychologically damaging because the testator must confront the inevitability of death. While aboard the Pequod, Ishmael needed no reminder of
life’s fragility. But for many people, estate planning is one of the few
tasks that require direct consideration of their own mortality. Indeed, for
most individuals, contemplating one’s death is difficult and unpleasant,44
and may evoke severe negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and even
terror.45 While the severity of these antitherapeutic consequences varies,46 all testators are susceptible to some degree of death anxiety because the confrontation with death is inherent to the estate-planning
process.47 A wide array of unique concerns may produce a particular testator’s anxiety, which likely vary depending on each testator’s distinct
situation.48 Because a multitude of considerations—including “personal
circumstances of age, wealth, family, personality, [and] attitude toward
death,”—affect each testator’s decision to exercise testamentary power,49
these same characteristics may likewise affect the nature and severity of
the testator’s death anxiety.
Although the sources of death anxiety vary, psychologists have
identified seven general concerns that cause people to fear death:

44. See Beyer, supra note 39, at 419; Charles I. Nelson & Jeanne M. Starck, Formalities and
Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 348 (1979) (explaining
that “facing the reality of death and its attendant consequences is one of the most difficult responsibilities in life”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (“[D]eath is an unpleasant fact to modern man.”).
45. See ROBERT FIRESTONE & JOYCE CATLETT, BEYOND DEATH ANXIETY xi (2009) (explaining that sadness, anger, and fear are the appropriate emotions caused by facing one’s mortality); Eric
Strachan et al., Coping with the Inevitability of Death: Terror Management and Mismanagement, in
COPING WITH STRESS: EFFECTIVE PEOPLE AND PROCESS 120 (2001) (explaining that because
“[h]umans are self-conscious and capable of infinite abstraction . . . we are aware of the inevitability
of death, which is terrifying for an animal born with an innate desire for continued life,” and adding
that “[d]eath . . . is unknown, which is terrifying”).
46. See ROBERT KASTENBAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEATH 130 (3d ed. 2000) (“There are
some weak indication that people in favorable socioeconomic circumstances report relatively lower
levels of death anxiety.”); Rebecca Helen Lehto & Karen Farchaus Stein, Death Anxiety: An Analysis of an Evolving Concept, 23 RES. & THEORY FOR NURSING PRAC. 23, 31–32 (2009) (“[D]eath
anxiety is a multidimensional construct related to fear of and anxiety related to the anticipation and
awareness of the reality of dying and death that includes emotional, cognitive, and motivational
components that vary by developmental stage and sociocultural life occurrences.”).
47. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that “[t]he testamentary experience” is “taboo-defying,” and that “[p]eople going through . . . [t]aboo-defying experiences . . . tend to be upset”); see also Lehto & Stein, supra note 46, at 24 (“Confronting death and the anxiety generated by
knowledge of its inevitability is a universal psychological quandary for humans.”).
48. See In re Trusteeship Agreement with Nash, 122 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1963) (noting
that “every testator’s circumstances and plan of disposition is unique”); Pamela R. Champine, My
Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 453
(2001) (“[T]hose who leave wills” have “unique circumstances.”).
49. Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L. REV. 630, 652 (1992).
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(1) they can no longer have any life experiences;
(2) they may be uncertain as to what will happen to them if there is
a life after death;
(3) they may be afraid of what will happen to their bodies after
death;
(4) they realize they will no longer be able to care for their dependants;
(5) they realize that their death will cause grief to their relatives and
friends;
(6) they realize that all their plans and projects will come to an end;
and
(7) they may be afraid that the process of dying will be painful.50

Studies analyzing these considerations in the context of estate planning suggest that many testators are burdened by the same worries during
the preparation of a testamentary scheme and the exercise of testamentary power.51 Moreover, the anxiety of no longer providing for the needs of
one’s family and the realization that one’s life work will come to an end
are of particular concern for many testators.52
Death anxiety’s potential severity is evident in the effort that many
people expend to avoid activities that require consideration of death.53
Indeed, “most [people] prefer to remain oblivious to the angel of death
resting on [their] shoulders,”54 and as a result, many ignore their own
mortality.55 For example, a relatively small number of adults opt into
organ-donor programs, despite a large percentage of the public approving
of organ donation.56 A variety of explanations for this phenomenon have

50. Beyer, supra note 39, 419–20.
51. See, e.g., id.; Shaffer, supra note 14, at 378–79.
52. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963,
985 (1987).
53. See Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 584 (2003)
(“[P]eople delay beginning estate tax liability reduction activities” because “such activities require
contemplating one’s own death.”); Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641, 654 (1999) (“One also
suspects that many people feel a strong aversion to annuitizing their wealth, arising in part from an
unwillingness to face the prospect of old age and death ‘rationally.’”); Louise Harmon, Fragments
on the Deathwatch, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1, 116 (1992) (“[A] sign of the taboo nature of death, even in
the medical profession, is the avoidance of the dying person. Not only do health care workers not
want to talk about a patient who is dying, but often they do not want to talk to a patient who is dying.
Of course, this kind of avoidance behavior is not confined to health care workers; it is just a manifestation of what is come to be called ‘death anxiety.’”).
54. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1989).
55. See KASTENBAUM, supra note 46, at 128; see also Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that “personal death is a thought modern man will do almost anything to avoid”).
56. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, prefatory note, (2007); Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy
as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L.
67, 67–68 (2008); Cohen, supra note 54, at 9.
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been suggested,57 but the public’s general reluctance to acknowledge the
inevitability of death is a primary reason for low organ-donation rates.58
Other activities that people avoid as a defense mechanism for death anxiety include end-of-life medical planning59 and preparation for retirement.60
Similarly, many people evade thoughts of mortality by refusing to
prepare an estate plan and execute a will.61 As the sixteenth-century essayist Michel de Montaigne observed, “You can frighten . . . people by
mentioning death . . . and since it is mentioned in wills, never expect
them to draw one up before the doctor has pronounced the deathsentence.”62 Everyone who regularly plans for others’ deaths, even professional estate planners and probate lawyers, may be reluctant to execute wills because of the resulting contemplation of mortality.63 The
effects of death anxiety, however, were manifest in the avoidance of estate planning long before the days of Montaigne. For example, in “ancient times,” some individuals held irrational beliefs like the fear that
death closely and attentively follows those who execute wills.64 Not surprisingly, this ubiquitous fear of death continues to affect estate planning
in modern times, as the avoidance of acknowledging mortality contributes to today’s high rates of intestacy.65

57. See Clamon, supra note 56, at 68; Cohen, supra note 54, at 9.
58. See Cohen, supra note 54, at 10.
59. Ben Kusmin, Note, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot: Abandoning the Disinterested Witness
Requirement for Advance Directives, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 110–11 (2006).
60. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan AntiDiscrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 818 (1988).
61. See Beyer, supra note 16, at 778 (“[M]any individuals procrastinate in making a will as a
conscious or unconscious defense against admitting mortality.”); G. Warren Whitaker, Classic Issues
in Family Succession Planning, PROB. & PROP. 32, 37 (Mar.Apr. 2003) (“[I]t should not be surprising when a client with significant succession issues refuses to do any planning, or when a client asks
his estate planner to prepare his or her will quickly and then allows it to languish unexecuted for
months.”).
62. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 93 (M. A. Screech trans., Penguin Books
1991) (1580).
63. Beyer, supra note 39, at 419. Professional estate planners may also have difficulty explicitly mentioning the possibility of their client’s death; see Shaffer, supra note 40, at 355–62 (“These
clients and lawyers (and I should emphasize that I am reporting on the conduct of lawyers as well as
the conduct of clients) evaded and tended to deny the reality of the clients’ deaths.”).
64. Beyer, supra note 39, at 419; see also Hirsch, supra note 39, at 1048 (“For centuries now,
would-be testators have harbored the fear that if they executed their wills, the documents would
become relevant in short order.”).
65. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 71 (8th ed. 2009). Other
factors may contribute to a person dying intestate, including a “lack of information about the probate
system and an unfounded assumption that a person’s ‘family’ automatically inherits the person’s
property.” Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L.
REV. 643, 650 (2002). Of course, death anxiety, procrastination, and ignorance are not the only
reasons that one may die intestate. For example, as part of their “gypsy style of life” in which they
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Another potential consequence of death anxiety is the deterioration
of the testator’s decision-making capabilities. Montaigne observed this
consequence of death anxiety five centuries ago when he exclaimed,
“[I]n the midst of pain and terror [caused by the acknowledgment of
death], God only knows what shape [the testator’s] good judgement
kneads [the will] into!”66 Modern legal scholars have confirmed Montaigne’s observation and have reported that “[t]hinking about unpleasant
facts” such as the inevitability of death “can bias decisionmaking by inducing fear or anxiety,”67 especially in the context of preparing an estate
plan and executing a will.68
Perhaps the most significant way that death anxiety affects a testator’s decision-making process is that it provides an incentive to make
hastily considered decisions regarding his testamentary scheme. Oftentimes, people cope with the anxiety that accompanies significant choices
by quickly making difficult decisions, thereby abbreviating the stressful
experience.69 As one psychologist has explained, stressors such as death
anxiety can “impair decision making [because,] [u]nder stress, people
who normally consider all aspects of a situation before making a decision
may act impulsively.”70 This truncated decision-making process is characterized by an erratic method of selecting information for consideration, an inadequate amount of time spent considering the relevant information and evaluating alternatives, and the absence of reevaluation after

are “insulated from society,” the “Hell’s Angels don’t find it necessary to leave wills, and their
deaths don’t require much paperwork . . . . A driver’s license expires, a police record goes into the
dead file, a motorcycle changes hands and usually a few ‘personal cards’ will be taken out of wallets
and dropped into wastebaskets.” HUNTER S. THOMPSON, HELL’S ANGELS: A STRANGE AND
TERRIBLE SAGA 143–44 (Modern Library 1999) (1966).
66. MONTAIGNE, supra note 62, at 93.
67. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 234 (2008);
see also Christina Cooley, Maximizing Patient Autonomy through Expanded Medical Surrogacy
Mediation, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 235 (2006) (“The psychological reluctance of people to
confront their own mortality along with grief in facing death, denial, anxiety, and loneliness, may
also severely affect decision-making abilities.”); Elizabeth Baker Murrill, Mass Disaster Mediation:
Innovative ADR, or A Lion’s Den?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 401, 415–18 (2007) (“[S]tressors on
the psyche are linked to cognition and capacity for decision making. Cognitive effects of stress are
significant and include narrowing of attention or perceptual tunneling, reduced working memory,
and rigidity.”).
68. See Marvin B. Sussman et al., Will Making: An Examination of Client and Lawyer Attitudes, 23 FLA. L. REV. 25, 49 (1970) (“[T]he individual who is faced with the possibility of imminent death may make hasty and short-sighted decisions regarding the provisions of his will.”).
69. See Willis, supra note 67, at 234.
70. DOUGLAS A. BERNSTEIN & PEGGY W. NASH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 397 (4th ed.
2007); see also Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68
LA. L. REV. 117, 152 (2007) (“Pressure and stress might disrupt optimal decision making. When
individuals encounter a sufficiently high degree of stress, they are likely to fail to optimally consider
their options and actions.”).
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the decision has been made.71 Ultimately, this abridged decision-making
process can result in the decision-maker acting carelessly and often produces bad decisions.72
This defense mechanism for death anxiety and its negative consequences are easily applicable to the estate-planning context.73 For instance, by quickly making decisions concerning an estate plan, the testator can shorten his confrontation with mortality in an attempt to reduce
his fear and anxiety of death. But while using this shortened decisionmaking process, the testator may not fully consider the factors that typically influence a testamentary scheme, such as relationships with friends
and relatives or the extent and nature of property owned. In sum, death
anxiety’s influence on the decision of whether to plan for the distribution
of one’s property upon death, as well as its effect on the decision-making
capabilities of those who do prepare estate plans, illustrates the potential
negative consequences of confronting death through the estate-planning
process. The death anxiety that stems from the testator’s inevitable confrontation with death is therefore a primary antitherapeutic consequence
of the estate-planning process.
B. Estate Disputes and Familial Conflict
In addition to the anxiety caused by the recognition of mortality,74 a
testator may also experience fear and anxiety because of the possibility
of an estate dispute.75 A recent poll found that 18% of wealthy Ameri
71. See Andrei C. Miu et al., Anxiety and Decision-Making: Toward a Neuroeconomics Perspective, in 20 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH:
NEUROECONOMICS 55, 66 (2008) (describing the differences between vigilant decision-making and
hypervigilant decision making). “This kind of decision-making, although originally acknowledged as
saving time and effort, was nonetheless viewed as a defective coping pattern that interrupted the
cognitive process required for optimal decision-making. Stress tended to increase the use of hypervigilant decision-making and the frequency of error in logical analogy tasks.” Id. (citations omitted).
72. See BERNSTEIN & NASH, supra note 70, at 397; Willis, supra note 67, at 234.
73. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
74. See supra Part III.A.
75. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63,
85 (1978) (“The testator who has cause to fear that his physical and mental condition will be made
the basis for extornationate post-mortem litigation challenging his testamentary capacity has a moral
claim on the legal system to provide him with the means of preventing the depredation.”); Lela P.
Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 564 (2008) (explaining that testators may anticipate or fear
discord over the provisions of their wills).
One form of estate dispute is a will contest, which is a challenge of a will’s validity that is usually
based upon allegations of inadequate mental capacity or undue influence. See Dennis W. Collins,
Avoiding a Will Contest—The Impossible Dream?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 8 (2000) (“Most will
contests occur because of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity claims, although they
may obviously involve lack of proper execution, forgery, altered documents, revocation, mistake,
fraud, duress and insane delusion.”); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests: An Empirical Study, 22
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cans fear that their families will fight over their fortunes once they are
gone.76 Numerous high-profile estate disputes have littered newspaper
headlines in recent years and illustrate the legitimacy of these fears.77
These concerns are not limited to large estates, however, as many estate
disputes are waged even when little material value is at stake.78 Furthermore, although some testators, such as Ishmael (who was a bachelor and
an orphan),79 may have little to fear because they have no relatives to
disinherit and therefore no relatives to disappoint, even previously amicable families can turn astringent when a relative’s estate is at issue.80
The root of a testator’s anxiety regarding a potential estate dispute
may vary. For example, the testator may fear the family conflict that accompanies almost all estate litigation.81 Estate disputes are often brought
by family members of the decedent who may be motivated by a variety
of factors, such as perceived unfair treatment by the testator’s distributive scheme, complicated family dynamics, or strained familial relation
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 646–52 (1987) (reporting that 74% of will contests involved allegations of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity, and 14% of will contests brought challenges based upon lack of adherence to required formalities).
76. See Jennifer Harper, Splitting Heirs Over Wealth: But Children Usually Inherit Most of It,
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2006, at A1.
77. See Dean Praetorius & Nathalie Tadena, Celebrity Estate Disputes from Michael Jackson,
Steve McNair to Anna Nicole Smith, ABC NEWS (June 22, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
story?id=8129259&page=1. “Will contests rarely occur, perhaps on the order of one in one hundred
or so cases.” Schoenblum, supra note 75, at 614. But a testator’s fears are not unfounded because the
millions of probates that occur each year make a “one-in-a-hundred litigation pattern[]” a “very
serious” problem. John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5 (1994). Furthermore, “the devastation to family relationships that often accompanies a will contest gives the problem weight beyond its numbers.” Andrew Stimmel, Note, Mediating Will Disputes: A Proposal to
Add a Discretionary Mediation Clause to the Uniform Probate Code, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 197, 222 (2002); see also Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimidating Disgruntled
Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 264 (1998) (“Testators . . . have
legitimate reasons for wanting to avoid contests and their concomitant results.”).
78. See Judith G. McMullen, Keeping Peace in the Family While You Are Resting in Peace:
Making Sense of and Preventing Will Contests, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 61, 61–62 (2006).
79. See AUGUST NIGRO, THE NET OF NEMESIS, STUDIES IN TRAGIC BOND/AGE 91 (2000).
80. See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Fortune of the Republic, in THE POLITICAL EMERSON,
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND SOCIAL REFORM 185, 195 (David M. Robinson ed., 2004)
(“When it comes to divid[ing] an estate, the politest men will sometimes quarrel.”); McMullen,
supra note 78, at 61 (“Family members often fight over the estates of their departed loved ones. It is
a safe guess, however, that many of these decedents had confidently assumed that their own families
would not fight . . . .”).
81. See Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 397 (1997) (“Persons
planning the transfer of property after death . . . view family harmony as a tangential, but important
goal.”); Mary F. Radford, An Introduction to the Uses of Mediation and Other Forms of Dispute
Resolution in Probate, Trust, and Guardianship Matters, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 637–
38 (2000) (“Many, if not most, cases arising in probate, trust, and guardianship involve families
whose relationships could be irreparably shattered by bitter and prolonged litigation.”).
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ships caused by the grief of losing a loved one.82 But regardless of the
underlying personal reasons for challenges over decedents’ estates,
“[s]uch contests often breed irreconcilable family feuds.”83 Relatives are
frequently pitted against each other, old family disputes are renewed, and
familial relationships are irreversibly damaged.84 Therefore, because the
preparation of an estate plan can lead to family conflict that spans generations, the testator may experience antitherapeutic effects from the estate-planning process.
In addition to straining familial relationships, an estate dispute can
bring public scrutiny and invasion of privacy, both of which may exacerbate family conflict and can cause the testator added fear and anxiety
during the estate-planning process.85 Because the testator’s mental competency is at issue in the majority of estate disputes,86 estate litigation
often involves investigations into the testator’s unique and deeply personal characteristics.87 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
explained, “Contests over the allowance of wills frequently, if not invariably, result in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs, conduct, idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of
the testator . . . .”88
Scrutiny of the testator’s private life may generate criticism and ridicule of the decedent and can be embarrassing and hurtful for the decedent’s family.89 Indeed, most people, even those who believe that they
have nothing to hide, do not want their personal affairs scrutinized in a
public forum.90 In the context of estate disputes, the potential damage to
testators’ reputations is especially acute because they invariably lack the

82. See Gary, supra note 81, at 41523; Stimmel, supra note 77, at 199–201; see also Ronald
Chester, Mediation and Jury Trials as Means of Resolving Will Contests, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
267, 267 (2001) (noting that “will contests are family disputes first and legal and financial ones
second”).
83. Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881).
84. See Gary, supra note 81, at 397; Radford, supra note 81, at 637–38; Yolanda Vorys, Note,
The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-arb for Resolving Will Disputes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 871, 874–75 (2007).
85. See Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567.
86. See Collins, supra note 75, at 8.
87. See Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 636 (1994); see also Beyer et al., supra note 77, at 264–65.
88. Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928).
89. See Begleiter, supra note 87, at 636 (explaining that “the publicity surrounding a will contest” is characterized by “ridicule, contempt, and criticism”); Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567
(“A testator whose dispositions depart from social norms may fear a contest because the trial will
expose his or her personal life, and that of his family, to public humiliation or ridicule.”); see also
Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886 (“[S]uspicions or beliefs in personal insanity, mental weakness, eccentricities,
pernicious habits, or other odd characteristics centering in or radiating from the testator, may bring
his family into evil repute and adversely affect the standing in the community of its members.”).
90. See Begleiter, supra note 87, at 636.
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opportunity to defend themselves after their death.91 The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged this concern when it observed over one hundred
years ago that estate disputes “not infrequently [bring] to light matters of
private life that ought never to be made public, and in respect to which
the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in explanation or denial.”92 Therefore, because it provides a medium for the public airing of the
“dirty laundry” of testators and their families,93 the possibility of a will
contest may cause testators stress and anxiety during the estate-planning
process.
In sum, an estate dispute “may bring sorrow and suffering to many
concerned.”94 A challenge to the validity of a will or another estateplanning document can tarnish “the fair reputation of the dead” and disrupt “the peace and harmony of the living.”95 The potential for both familial conflict and public scrutiny are two possible sources of fear and
anxiety for testators, but they may also worry about a variety of other
negative consequences of an estate dispute, including the financial depletion of their estates and the frustration of their desired distributive
schemes.96 As a result, while preparing and implementing an estate plan,
testators may experience fear and anxiety from the possibility that an
estate dispute and its negative consequences will plague the administration of their estates.
C. Fear of Probate
In addition to death anxiety97 and anxiousness regarding estate disputes and familial conflict,98 testators may worry about the administra
91. See Alper v. Alper, 65 A.2d 737, 740 (N.J. 1949) (explaining that will contests provide the
opportunity for contestants to “besmirch[] the reputation of the testator when he is no longer alive to
defend himself”); Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886 (explaining that the testator “is not alive and cannot explain
what may without explanation be given a sinister appearance”). “For most decedents, the fact that
the spectacle would not occur until after [their] death[s] would provide small solace.” Love & Sterk,
supra note 75, at 553.
92. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 402 (1898); see also Begleiter, supra note 87, at
637 (“The recognition of the importance of this factor to testators by the United States Supreme
Court is quoted in almost every case involving a no-contest clause.”).
93. Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 567 (“A testator . . . may fear a [will] contest because . . . [of] the prospect that the family’s dirty laundry will be aired in public.”); see also Begleiter, supra note 87, at 636–39 (describing the scrutiny under which a testator’s life is examined during a will contest under the heading of “Family Antagonism and the Airing of Dirty Linen in Public”).
94. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886.
95. Id.
96. See Love & Sterk, supra note 75, at 539 (explaining that preservation of family harmony,
conservation of estate assets, and avoidance of airing the family’s dirty laundry are “objectives
common to many testators”).
97. See supra Part III.A.
98. See supra Part III.B.
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tion of their estates after they are gone. Specifically, many people planning for the disposition of their estates have concerns regarding the probate process.99 Over the past several decades, the probate process has
drawn criticism from legal scholars for being cumbersome and inefficient.100 As Professor John Langbein explained, “The probate system has
earned a lamentable reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, makework, and worse.”101 Fueled by businesses’ marketing services to avoid
the probate process,102 those who desire to make estate plans now frequently harbor their own concerns regarding the probate process.103
These concerns fall within three general categories.104 First, testators are often concerned with the length of the probate process.105 These
concerns are not unfounded as “administration of an estate typically lasts
for many months or even years.”106 Testators realize that their families
will be coping with their deaths during the probate process,107 and many
are anxious to circumvent probate in order to shield their families from
the time-consuming distractions of the process.108 Second, testators often
fear the administrative costs that accompany the probate process,109
which include “probate court fees, the commission of the personal representative, the attorney’s fees, and, sometimes, appraiser’s and guardian

99. See THE COLUMBIA RETIREMENT HANDBOOK 220 (Abraham Monk ed., 1994) (“Estate
planning clients frequently have an exaggerated fear of the probate process . . . .”). Probate is the
judicially administered process by which a decedent’s debts are paid and legal title of probate assets
is transferred to the estate beneficiaries. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 39.
100. See, e.g., PAULA A. MONOPOLI, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC,
IMPROVING THE PROCESS (2003) (“The American probate process has long been perceived as slow,
expensive, and corrupt.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of
Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 542 (2000) (describing the probate system as “timeconsuming and costly, or even in some venues a modern form of grave-robbery”).
101. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1116 (1984).
102. See Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care
for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 208–09.
103. See THE COLUMBIA RETIREMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 220.
104. John H. Martin, Reconfiguring Estate Settlement, 94 MINN. L. REV. 42, 48 (2009) (“Delay, expense, and lack of privacy are three universal criticisms of probate.”).
105. See id.
106. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 630 (4th ed. 2010); see
also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 440.
107. See Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 411, 437–38 (2009) (describing practitioner accounts of clients’ concerns regarding their families enduring the probate process); see also
Denise Johnson et al., Working Group on the Restructuring of, and Access to, the Judiciary, 34 VT.
B.J. 38, 40 (2009) (explaining that the “probate court must accommodate a largely pro se clientele in
various stages of stress or grief”).
108. See Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529, 531 (2006) (citing delay as a reason that many people attempt to
avoid probate).
109. See Martin, supra note 104, at 50 (“A second universal criticism of probate is expense.”).
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ad litem’s fees.”110 These expenses can mount quickly,111 and some testators consequently worry that probate costs will consume a large portion
of their estates.112 Finally, some testators are concerned with privacy issues, which can arise even absent an estate dispute.113 Because the testator’s will is a public record, free to be viewed by anyone,114 some testators fear public scrutiny of their financial and familial matters.115
In sum, while preparing an estate plan, the testator may harbor fears
of the probate system because it can cause lengthy delays in the administration of the estate, excessive administrative costs, and invasions of privacy.116 The anxiety that these concerns produce is exemplified by the
time, money, and effort that many people expend to avoid the probate
process. Fear of probate is therefore a potential negative psychological
effect of preparing an estate plan. When taken together with death anxiety117 and concerns regarding estate disputes and familial conflict,118 these
fears comprise the antitherapeutic consequences of the estate-planning
process.
IV. THERAPEUTIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE PLANNING
Although the estate-planning process can cause death anxiety and
other antitherapeutic consequences,119 many testators experience peace
and satisfaction from preparing and implementing estate plans.120 For
example, Ishmael drew comfort from his testamentary experience aboard
the Pequod, and he was not alone in using his estate plan as a source of
contentment while at sea.121 While Ishmael’s actions may appear idiosyncratic, the use of the estate-planning process as a distraction from the
perilous environment in which sailors worked was not an isolated occur
110. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 45–46.
111. See id.
112. See Gary, supra note 108, at 541; Ellen Sugrue Hyman & William Josh Ard, Trust Mills
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 86 MICH. B.J. 26, 28 (2007) (Members of the public have
“concerns that they will lose their hard-earned money through the onerous costs of . . . probate.”);
Martin, supra note 104, at 50.
113. See Martin, supra note 104, at 51–52.
114. See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 721–22 (2006).
115. See Gary, supra note 108, at 531 (citing the “desire for privacy” as a major factor in the
decision to avoid probate); Martin, supra note 104, at 51–52 (“Lack of privacy is a third significant
objection to traditional probate.”).
116. See Martin, supra note 104, at 48–52.
117. See supra Part III.A.
118. See supra Part III.B.
119. See supra Part III.
120. See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 368 (“[C]lients find the experience of realistic, informed
‘estate planning’ therapeutic.”).
121. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248.
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rence aboard whaling ships.122 As Ishmael described, “It may seem
strange that of all men sailors should be tinkering at their last wills and
testaments, but there are no people in the world more fond of that diversion.”123 The use of testamentary power as a therapeutic tool was so
common that sailors often amended their wills on multiple occasions
while at sea, as Ishmael himself did three times prior to his encounter
with the Whale.124 Ishmael’s account is silent as to the precise source of
his contentment;125 however, several aspects of the estate-planning
process may explain the therapeutic nature of his testamentary experience.
A. Freedom of Testation
Subject to limited exceptions, testators enjoy broad freedom to craft
their estate plans as they choose.126 For example, Ishmael took advantage
of this liberty when he bequeathed his entire estate to his friend, Queequeg.127 Testamentary freedom is so fundamental that it has consistently
been heralded as the keystone of the law of succession.128 A number of
policies underlie freedom of testation,129 including that the doctrine fosters the testator’s autonomy by allowing him to make significant decisions concerning the distribution of his estate.130 This opportunity for

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 248–49. Some have suggested that Ishmael’s satisfaction stemmed from his achieving a kind of immortality through the writing of his will. See, e.g., EDWIN S. SHNEIDMAN, A
COMMONSENSE BOOK OF DEATH: REFLECTIONS AT NINETY OF A LIFELONG THANATOLOGIST 150
(2008); Tony Tanner, Introduction to HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK xxv (Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1851). In his novel, The Dharma Bums, Jack Kerouac provides another literary example of a
character that derives ambiguous pleasure from testamentary power. When Henry Morley is called
“crazy” by Ray Smith, who is the fictional representation of Kerouac and the story’s narrator, he
responds by saying, “I dunno, maybe I am, but if I am I’ll leave a lovely will anyway.” JACK
KEROUAC, THE DHARMA BUMS 31 (Penguin Books 2006) (1958).
126. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
491 (1975); see also In re Caruthers’ Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“A testator’s right to bestow his property by will at death is as absolute as his right to convey it during his
life time.”).
127. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248.
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
(2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the
donor’s intention.”); Langbein, supra note 126, at 491 (“The first principle of the law of wills is
freedom of testation.”).
129. See Adam J. Hirsch & William K. S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 6–14 (1992) (providing a comprehensive description of the various rationales for allowing testamentary freedom).
130. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L.
REV. 1705, 1754 (1992); see also Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1354–55 (“[I]t is not a surprise that the
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self-determination can have therapeutic consequences for the testator
because psychological welfare generally improves when one is allowed
to make important choices autonomously.131 As Winick explained, “[I]f
given meaningful choices, individuals will perceive themselves as in
control of their lives rather than as mere passive victims of forces they
can neither understand nor control.”132 Consequently, “people [generally]
feel better about making their own decisions rather than having them imposed upon them by another.”133
The most basic therapeutic consequence of the autonomous decision-making permitted by testamentary freedom is the testators’ satisfaction of knowing that they have wide latitude to prepare an estate plan that
best fulfills their preferences. Although state legislatures attempt to craft
intestacy statutes in a way that mimics most individuals’ testamentary
preferences,134 all testators are unique and best know their own distinct
needs and desires.135 As such, a testator whose preferences differ from
the default distributional scheme of intestacy will find satisfaction in testamentary freedom. As Winick further explained, “An individual’s
choices from the menu of life are inevitably bound to prove more selfsatisfying and suitable than any made by an impersonal bureaucrat or
even an enlightened philosopher king.”136 Therefore, because testators
best know their unique testamentary preferences, they can receive therapeutic benefit from the ability to freely construct the substance of their
estate plans in a way that matches those preferences.
Of the various preferences that testators can satisfy through freedom of testation, perhaps the most urgent and universal is the care of
their families after the testators’ own deaths.137 Because testamentary

concept of autonomy is a factor in probates, since writing a will is the mechanism by which an individual determines how and to whom his property will be distributed.”).
131. Beyer, supra note 16, at 779 (“Estate planning . . . permits persons to exercise increased
self-determination and consequently provides them with a sense of control over their environment
and destiny.”); Winick, supra note 130, at 1766–67; Winick, supra note 15, at 191 (“[S]elfdetermination is therapeutically advantageous.”); Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 113 (2000) (“Exercising a degree of control
and self-determination in significant aspects of one’s life may be an important ingredient of psychological wellbeing.”); Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1353.
132. Winick, supra note 130, at 1766.
133. Winick, supra note 131, at 112–13.
134. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 75.
135. See Baron, supra note 49, at 652.
136. Winick, supra note 130, at 1756.
137. See Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform
Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 913 (1999) (“Most testators are bent on providing for their families.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 385 (explaining that the “general impression” that testators’ most
pressing concern is planning for the care of their families is confirmed in tests of “wills clients”);
Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 49 (reporting results from a study that showed “[t]he principal
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freedom allows testators to prepare their estate plans as they choose, they
can distribute their estates to relatives, which both helps meet familial
needs and provides the testators the satisfaction of knowing that they
have taken steps to meet those needs. Indeed, many testators feel a profound moral responsibility to provide financial support to family members through their estate plans, and satisfying this moral obligation can
provide great comfort.138 Unsurprisingly, most testators fulfill this perceived moral duty and distribute the bulk of their estates within the family.139 Therefore, because testamentary freedom can provide comfort and
satisfaction to testators by allowing them to make autonomous choices
regarding the distribution of their estates, freedom of testation is one therapeutic consequence of the estate-planning process.
B. Lawyers as Counselors
Another potentially therapeutic aspect of estate planning is the role
of estate-planning attorneys who, in addition to acting as legal representatives, can provide personal support to their clients. Consider, for example, Ishmael’s testamentary experience aboard the Pequod. Unlike the
typical testator who engages a lawyer during the estate-planning
process,140 Ishmael lacked access to an attorney while at sea.141 Nonetheless, Ishmael asked his crewmate, Queequeg, to accompany him below
deck and take part in the testamentary experience.142 As Ishmael recalled,
“I say, I thought I might as well go below and make a rough draft of my
will. ‘Queequeg,’ said I, ‘come along, you shall be my lawyer, executor,

reason why individuals [make] wills [is] their desire to protect the well-being of members of their
immediate families”).
In addition to the inability to provide continuing support to their families, a second consequence
of death that troubles many testators is the realization that their “plans and projects [will] come to an
end.” Shaffer, supra note 52, at 984. An estate plan, however, can be viewed “as a method to prolong experience through continuation of projects.” Shaffer, supra note 14, at 380. A financial bequest to family members may satisfy the testator’s desire for the continuation of projects, but other
bequests may also serve this purpose, such as gifts to provide for the care of a beloved pet. See generally Breahn Vokolek, Comment, America Gets What It Wants: Pet Trusts and a Future for Its
Companion Animals, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1109 (2008).
138. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 387–88; Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 36.
139. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 207 (1987).
140. See Daphna Hacker, Soulless Wills, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 957, 977–80 (2010)
(“[L]awyers dominate the will-production market, and most testators turn to them for advice in drafting their wills.”).
141. But in certain regards, the sailors onboard the Pequod had to act as their own lawyers. See
MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 432 (“But though no other nation has ever had any written whaling law,
yet the American fisherman have been their own legislators and lawyers in this matter.”); see also
Robert C. Deal, Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish: How Whalemen, Lawyers, and Judges Created the British
Property Law of Whaling, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 199, 200–01 (2010).
142. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248.
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and legatee.’”143 Ishmael’s putative estate-planning attorney had no legal
training and could not offer advice regarding the technicalities of will
execution; however, Queequeg could provide companionship and psychological support. Like Ishmael’s trusted friend, a formally trained lawyer can assist the testator with more than mere legal issues, and in doing
so, the estate-planning attorney can be a therapeutic agent for the client.
A lawyer’s duties have long included responsibilities outside the
realm of traditional legal services,144 and while providing legal representation, a lawyer frequently gives advice regarding nonlegal issues.145 For
example, some clients’ legal problems may be closely tied to corresponding nonlegal issues.146 But in an effort to obtain psychological support
regarding largely personal issues, other clients may seek assistance with
problems that have little or no legal consequences.147 As a result, lawyers
often address more than just the legal aspects of their clients’ problems.148 When the representation of a client focuses on these nonlegal
issues, the lawyer’s services are commonly classified as counseling.149
Certain considerations may dissuade lawyers from providing counseling services,150 but many do spend a large portion of their time coun
143. Id.
144. See Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 365 (2005) (explaining that “[a]s they have for centuries,” “[l]awyers must often be more than lawyers” in today’s legal
market); Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, The Lawyer as a Family Counselor: As the Social Worker
Sees Him, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 28, 28 (1953) (explaining that “counseling in the law” has been
“importan[t] from time immemorial”).
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2006) (“In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a
lawyer may refer not only to law but also to other considerations such as moral, economic, social,
and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
146. See Gantt, supra note 144, at 366.
147. See Robert C. Mussehl, From Advocate to Counselor: The Emerging Role of the Family
Law Practitioner, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 443, 446 (1976) (explaining that clients “consult lawyers about
matters which have little to do with legal issues and instead simply seek emotional support”).
148. Gantt, supra note 144, at 365 (explaining that lawyers often address the “moral, economic, and other nonlegal factors affecting their [clients’] situations”).
149. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers, Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A. J. 854,
854 (1975) (explaining that a lawyer’s counseling services often involve “subject matters that do not
result in documents, lawsuits, or negotiations with third persons”); Andrew S. Watson, The Lawyer
as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 7 (1965) (“Although persons going into practice of law have many and
diverse interests, there will be thrust upon all of them to some degree, tasks which are best described
as counseling.”).
150. See Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 202
MIL. L. REV. 185, 193–94 (2009) (suggesting that lawyers “may fear professional consequences for
practicing psychology without a license,” and that “[t]hey may believe that their lack of training and
experience could hurt . . . the client”).

448

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 35:427

seling clients on nonlegal issues.151 For example, divorce attorneys are
often charged with counseling responsibilities because, while preparing
for divorce, clients are dealing with a wide array of psychological issues.152 The emotionally charged nature of divorce therefore provides
lawyers with a ripe opportunity to be therapeutic agents for their
clients.153
Similar to divorce, which signals the “death of a marriage,”154 the
preparation and implementation of an estate plan foreshadows the death
of the testator and can negatively affect the client’s emotional and psychological well-being.155 For instance, while preparing an estate plan and
executing a will, the testator must confront the inevitability of death,
which can cause death anxiety.156 Estate-planning lawyers thus have the
opportunity not only to guide testators through the estate-planning
process, but also to be therapeutic agents for their clients by addressing
the negative psychological consequences of preparing an estate plan.157
The lawyer’s services should not replace those of a mental health
care professional,158 but the lawyer should be aware of the client’s psychological issues and “explore with the client the need to find appropriate ways to resolve them so that the client can move forward.”159 While
aiding their clients during the estate-planning process, lawyers can inquire about testators’ potential death anxiety and discuss the specific

151. See Mussehl, supra note 147, at 446; Shaffer, supra note 149, at 854. One somewhat
outdated study found that “[t]he average lawyer spends about a third of his time counseling,” and an
older study suggested that some lawyers may “spend as much as 80 percent of their professional
time . . . counseling.” Shaffer, supra note 149, at 854.
152. See Mussehl, supra note 147, at 443 (“The client is often confused, frightened, and suffering emotional hurt.”); see also Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (“Divorce
brings out the worst in every individual; anxiety, emotion, anger, and revenge run rampant.”).
153. Mussehl, supra note 147, at 443 (“The lawyer, acting in a powerful and trusted capacity,
is in a prime position to direct either a destructive or a constructive course of action for the client.”).
154. Esther Oshiver Fisher, A Guide to Divorce Counseling, 22 FAM. COORDINATOR 55, 55
(1973) (explaining that “the husband and wife together with their children are the mourners, the
lawyers are the undertakers, the court is the cemetery where the coffin is sealed and the dead marriage buried”).
155. See supra Part III.
156. See supra Part III.
157. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 376 (“Lawyers who advise clients and draft documents in the
‘estate planning’ practice are counselors in more than the traditional legal sense. They are counselors
in the therapeutic or developmental sense.”); Richard Susskind, How the Traditional Role of Lawyers Will Change, TIMES ONLINE (Nov. 5, 2007) (“Private client lawyers (for example, those who
advise on divorces and draft wills) tell me that their job is not really about law; rather, they insist,
they are experienced counselors, confidantes, therapists even, in whom their clients have unwavering
faith in relation to their personal problems.”).
158. See Kathryn Webb Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limits: Comments on “Forgiveness: Integral
to Close Relationships and Inimical to Justice?”, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322, 332 (2009).
159. Id.; see also Marc W. Patry et al., Better Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research:
Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439, 441 (1998).
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concerns that may contribute to clients’ fears, such as the responsibility
to fulfill familial needs and the desire to continue important plans and
projects.160 After this discussion, the lawyer can alleviate some of the
client’s anxiety by preparing an estate plan that meets the client’s specific needs.161 Furthermore, death anxiety often impairs testators’ decisionmaking processes by drawing their attention from the significant decisions and relevant information that affect estate plans.162 The estateplanning lawyer, however, can encourage the testator to remain focused
on the important issues at hand and to consider carefully all relevant information when making testamentary decisions.163
Although a testator’s most common fears relate to the consequences
of death, the testator may also harbor anxieties regarding potential estate
disputes, familial conflicts,164 and probate-administration issues.165 The
testator’s lawyer can ease these concerns by suggesting estate-planning
techniques aimed at reducing the possibility of an estate dispute166 or by
facilitating constructive discussions between the testator and potentially
disappointed relatives.167 The lawyer can also reduce some of the testa
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 397 (“Lawyers who understand these anxieties are able to help
their clients leave the law office realistically consoled by the discovery that law provides ways” to
alleviate these concerns, including means “to feed one’s children, to continue one’s business, and to
rob death of some of its ability to frighten the living.”); see also Beyer, supra note 39, at 420
(“[T]actful counseling by the attorney during the entire estate planning process[] may make it easier
for clients to cope with the inevitability of death.”).
162. See supra Part III.A.
163. See Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 37 (“Where the client perceives the immediacy of
death, it may be important for the attorney to determine if the client’s plans are well considered and
satisfactory for the foreseeable future.”); see also Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that
testators who seek counsel from an estate-planning lawyer are “better able to make choices”). Indeed, “in subtle and unobtrusive ways [the lawyer can] influence[] his client to make the right decision[s].” Sussman et al., supra note 68, at 41.
164. See supra Part III.B.
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. “Testators benefit significantly when issues of conflict are resolved during the estate
planning process. For instance, testators gain peace of mind by knowing there will be greater likelihood of family harmony after they pass . . . .” Paul Fisher, The Power Tools of Estate Conflict Management, Recharging the Culture of Estate Conflicts, Part 2, PROB. & PROP., at 42, 42–43 (JulyAug. 2010) (suggesting methods of avoiding estate disputes).
167. See Patry et al., supra note 159, at 441–42. Patry et al. states the following:
For example, consider the situation of elderly parents with two adult children, one of
whom functions marginally because of a history of drug and alcohol problems. If, in
drafting a will, the parents leave funds outright to one child, but leave the money in a
trust to the one with drug problems, the parents may be creating a situation of hurt and
hard feelings. A lawyer . . . [can] discuss with the clients possible strategies of dealing
with—and minimizing—the law-related psychological distress. For instance, the clients
might speak now with the adult children, or they might specify in the will why they are
taking the indicated action, and so forth.
Id.
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tor’s fears of probate by explaining the intricacies of the probate process
and by providing the testator with realistic estimates of the delay and
expense of the process.
All told, the responsibilities of the estate-planning lawyer inherently include providing counseling services with respect to nonlegal issues.168 Although the estate-planning process can produce negative psychological consequences,169 lawyers who fulfill their counseling responsibilities can reduce these negative effects by providing emotional support, encouraging testators to focus on the task at hand, and reminding
testators that the law provides ways to address their concerns.170 If clients
show signs of extreme death anxiety or other severe emotional consequences resulting from the antitherapeutic aspects of estate planning,
lawyers can direct them to mental-health professionals who can better
address their psychological issues.171
C. The Will-Execution Ceremony
Although in recent years various legal instruments such as revocable trusts have become part of the estate-planning process,172 a will is
still an important component of most estate plans.173 As such, many

168. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377 (explaining that estate-planning lawyers cannot avoid
being counselors).
169. See supra Part III.
170. See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 368 (“[T]he professional relationship between wills client
and lawyer, when pursued candidly and with realistic and thorough consideration of what is involved, helps to allay [the testator’s] anxiety about death.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 377.
171. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (2006) (“Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social
work . . . . Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent
lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.”); Shaffer, supra note
149, at 854 (“We need to learn how to recognize . . . how to respect the competence of other counselors, how to refer a client to them with ease and with some assurance that the client will follow our
advice.”). See generally Carol M. Suzuki, When Something Is Not Quite Right: Considerations for
Advising a Client to Seek Mental Health Treatment, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 209 (2009).
172. See Langbein, supra note 101, at 1109–13 (describing the rise of the will substitutes).
Langbein further notes,
Either by declaration of trust or by transfer to a third-party trustee, the appropriate trust
terms can replicate the incidents of a will. The owner who retains both the equitable life
interest and the power to alter and revoke the beneficiary designation has used the trust
form to achieve the effect of testation. Only nomenclature distinguishes the remainder interest created by such a trust from the mere expectancy arising under a will. Under either
the trust or the will, the interest of the beneficiaries is both revocable and ambulatory.
Id.
173. Kent D. Schenkel, Testamentary Fragmentation and the Diminishing Role of the Will: An
Argument for Revival, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 160–62 (2008) (“[A] revocable trust will not
eliminate the need for a will; a will is still strongly advised under any plan to address any property
missed, either now or in the future, by any nonprobate technique being utilized.”); see also Ralph C.
Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 63, 63 n.1 (2009) (“Today, of
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people follow Ishmael’s lead and execute wills when preparing for the
disposition of their property upon death. While reflecting on his experience with the will-execution process, Ishmael described the creation of
his will as a “ceremony.”174 Likewise, legal scholars have consistently
characterized the will-execution process as “ritualistic”175 and “ceremonial.”176 This description stems from the formalities of will execution,
which generally require that a will be written, signed, and attested by at
least two witnesses.177 These formalities not only show the testator’s intent to create a will but also transform the will-execution process into a
ceremony or a ritual that can have therapeutic consequences for the testator.
One purpose of many ceremonies is to publicly signify the importance of the participants’ decisions, actions, or achievements.178 Marriage, for example, is a momentous occasion, and one purpose of an elaborate wedding ceremony is to provide a physical setting that symbolizes
the significance of the couple’s decision to marry.179 The exchange of
rings, the recitation of vows, and the presence of witnesses all represent
and impress on the wedding couple the significance of the event.180 Like
the decision to marry, the important choices that a testator makes while
creating an estate plan and executing a will warrant the acknowledgment
and validation of a meaningful setting in which to finalize those decisions.181 As one scholar has explained, “The estate planning

course, a large variety of will substitutes compete with and often even replace the will. Even so, the
will remains important for many estates.” (citations omitted)).
174. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 249.
175. See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Guttenberg Paradigm:
The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 131 (2008); Susan Tracey Stearns,
Note, Compressing Testamentary Intent Into Inter Vivos Delivery: What Makes a Conveyance Effective?—In re Estate of O’Brien, 109 Wash.2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988), 64 WASH. L. REV. 479, 481
n.22 (1989).
176. See, e.g., Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 111 (2006); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification
of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1941).
177. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 225.
178. JOHN SKORUPSKI, SYMBOL AND THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF
RELIGION IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 94 (1976) (“[T]he general characteristic of [a] ceremony” is
“that of making something out as proper and as socially on record.”). For example, the graduation
ceremony is recognition of the significant achievements of the graduates. See Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992). Similarly, corporate management may use
ceremonies to signify important business milestones. See RICHARD L. DAFT & PATRICIA G. LANE,
MANAGEMENT 78 (9th ed. 2009).
179. See JAMES L. GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 20 (8th ed. 2003);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 240–41.
180. See Scott, supra note 179, at 241–42.
181. See Estate Planning for Human Beings, 3 U. MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 69.1902 (P.
Heckerling ed., 1969) [hereinafter Estate Planning] (statement of Dean Willard H. Pedrick, panel-
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process . . . ought to be a high ceremonial occasion because a client
should be getting great intangible satisfaction about the[] significant decisions that he has made [and] that were embodied in the instruments
[that] he leaves behind.”182 Accordingly, the ceremonial quality of will
execution signifies the importance of the testator’s actions,183 and the
testamentary process consequently serves as a therapeutic experience for
the testator.184
In addition to signifying the importance of the testamentary act, the
will-execution ceremony gives testators a context through which to cope
with their inevitable confrontation with death. Indeed, many ceremonies
give participants a structured framework in which to organize and reflect
on their thoughts and emotions,185 a quality that can have positive psychological consequences.186 This therapeutic quality of ritual is perhaps
best exemplified by the funeral ceremony, which has often been described as a therapeutic experience for the surviving friends and family
of the deceased.187 Whatever form the ceremony takes, the funeral
achieves these therapeutic results by “help[ing] those . . . who remain to
organize [their] relationship with the deceased [and] to remember the
deceased within a framework.”188 Furthermore, the funeral’s therapeutic
effect lasts beyond the end of the service, as the ceremonial nature of the

ist); John A. Warnick, The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner’s Nightmare—The Trial Attorney’s
Dream, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 401, 422–23 (1989) (explaining that “the ceremonial aspect” of
will execution “may be important in fulfilling the clients unexpressed expectations”).
182. Estate Planning, supra note 181, § 69.1902.
183. See Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1064–65
(1996) (“The arcane minuet of the will-execution ceremony, like the marriage ceremony, serves to
impress upon the testator that on this occasion her words count, that this is no time for idle banter.”).
184. See Beyer, supra note 39, at 420.
185. See KEVIN CROTTY, THE POETICS OF SUPPLICATION: HOMER’S ILLIAD AND ODYSSEY 17
(1994) (explaining that ceremonial formalities “owe their significance in the first instance to their
ability to impress a distinctive shapeliness on life and, with it, a greater density of meaning than is
possible in the less structured, everyday course of events”); ANJALI GERA, THREE GREAT AFRICAN
NOVELISTS: CHINUA ACHEBE, WOLE SOYINKA & AMOS TUTUOLA 26 (2001) (“[C]eremonies provide a framework for experiencing reality.”).
186. See CROTTY, supra note 185, at 17 (explaining that formalities “enable [the ceremony] to
be an enlightening experience for its participants”).
187. See JAMES K. CRISSMAN, DEATH AND DYING IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA: CHANGING
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 95 (1994) (“Most contemporary psychiatrists, psychologists, grief counselors, funeral directors, members of the clergy, and other experts in the area of thanatology maintain
that emotional expression during the wake and funeral is therapeutic.”); see also DAVID HENDIN,
GRIEF AND BEREAVEMENT, in GROWING OLD IN AMERICA 184 (Beth B. Hess ed., 1980) (explaining
that a funeral “is a ceremony [that] assuages the grief of the survivors and is a comfort to them in
their loss”); WALTER W. WHITAKER III, THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FUNERAL RITUAL, in
RITUAL AND CEREMONIES IN POPULAR CULTURE 324 (Ray B. Browne ed., 1980) (“The first and
foremost [purpose of the funeral] is, of course, its capacity for enabling us to handle our grief.”).
188. WHITAKER, supra note 187, at 316.
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funeral can provide a lasting memory on which those in mourning can
reflect and take comfort.189
Like the funeral ceremony, which helps survivors cope with the decedent’s death, the will-execution ceremony can provide testators with a
structured framework through which to process the anxiety, fear, stress,
or other negative psychological consequences of preparing for their own
death. While participating in the will-execution ceremony, instead of
dwelling solely on their own mortality, testators must focus on the requirements of testamentary formality. As a result, the testator’s thoughts
are drawn away from the fear and anxiety that accompany the consideration of death, and are instead focused on the positive aspects of estate
planning,190 such as the preparation for the future, the fulfillment of familial needs, and the distribution of the estate according to the testator’s
wishes.191 Additionally, like the funeral ceremony, which can provide
friends and family members a comforting memory of their relationship
with the deceased, the will-execution ceremony can provide testators
with a lasting reminder that they have prepared for death, which can
comfort them long after the ceremony is over.192
In addition to creating an environment that both signifies the importance of testators’ decisions and provides a structured context in which to
process their thoughts and emotions, the will-execution ceremony can
bolster testators’ decision-making capabilities.193 As previously dis
189. See Robert J. Grindle, Note, Frenzy-Free Funerals: The Least America Owes Its Fallen
Heroes, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 637, 652 (2009) (stating that to deal with the emotions evoked by the
death of a friend or family member, “the funeral serves a coping function and may form a lasting
memory surrounding the death of a loved one”).
190. Kelly A. Hardin, Note, An Analysis of the Virginia Wills Act Formalities and the Need for
a Dispensing Power Statute in Virginia, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1145, 1153 n.51 (1993) (“Because
making a will is often a traumatic event, testators may need the formalities to help them avoid distractions . . . .”); see also CROTTY, supra note 185, at 18 (explaining that “in highly emotional situations” ceremonies “can enable the one afflicted to get out from under the immediate throes of emotion”). In his nonfiction account of Spanish bullfighting, Ernest Hemingway provided an example of
a ceremony that focuses attention away from traumatic events, which in the context of bullfighting is
the tragic death of the horses. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON 16 (Scribner 1999)
(1932). As he described:
I believe that the tragedy of the bullfight is so well ordered and so strongly disciplined by
ritual that a person feeling the whole tragedy cannot separate the minor comic-tragedy of
the horse so as to feel it emotionally. If they sense the meaning and end of the whole
thing even when they know nothing about it; feel that this thing they do not understand is
going on, the business of the horses is nothing more than an incident.
Id.
191. See supra Part IV.A.
192. The ceremonial nature of the will-execution process “fix[es] the event in the memory of
[the witnesses] who may survive.” Langbein, supra note 126, at 517. Likewise, the ceremony can
provide testators with a lasting memory of their planning and preparation for death.
193. Lydia A. Clougherty, An Analysis of the National Advsiory Committee on the Uniform
State Laws’ Recommendation to Modify the Wills Act Formalities, 10 PROB. L.J. 283, 284 (1991)
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cussed, the fear and anxiety that accompanies testators’ contemplation of
mortality can impair their decision-making processes by taking their attention away from important decisions.194 The ceremonial nature of the
will-execution process, however, can improve the testator’s decisionmaking process in two ways.
First, because testators do not often participate in ceremonies,195 the
testamentary ritual is distinguished from the mundane and relatively inconsequential tasks of daily life.196 The will-execution ceremony therefore impresses on testators the importance of their actions and decisions197 and consequently improves testators’ decision-making processes
by encouraging them to contemplate their testamentary choices and to
carefully consider all relevant information.198 Second, by providing testators with a framework through which to cope with their fears and anxieties, the will-execution ceremony draws their thoughts away from the
psychological distractions that hinder their decision-making processes.199
As a result, testators can focus on the testamentary decisions they must
make. The ritualistic nature of the will-execution process can therefore
improve the testator’s decision-making capabilities both by stressing the
importance of the testator’s decisions and by reducing the testator’s psychological distractions.
Altogether, the ritualistic characteristics of the will-execution
process can have positive psychological consequences for the testator.
The testator can take satisfaction from the formal setting in which the
testamentary act takes place,200 and the structured process of the ceremony can provide the testator a framework through which to cope with the

(“There is a great need for formalities to accompany will execution because the psychological effects
of drawing up a will inhibit the desired circumspective frame of mind, that of clear intent and deliberate estate planning.”).
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See Estate Planning, supra note 181, § 69.1902 (statement of Dean Willard H. Pedrick,
panelist).
196. See Kusmin, supra note 59, at 99; James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 544 (1990).
197. See In re Estate of Bilivskoy, 382 N.W.2d 729, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Langbein,
supra note 126, at 495.
198. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941)
(“A formality may . . . perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a check against inconsiderate action.”); C. Douglass Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform:
An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, Part One: The Wills Act Formula, the Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 261 (1991) (“A secondary aspect of
formality is its tendency to induce deliberation and reflection on the part of the testator.”).
199. See Hardin, supra note 190, at 1153 n.51; see also Clougherty, supra note 193, at 285
(“The formalities safeguard against psychological distractions which may disturb the testators deliberate and accurate estate planning.”).
200. See supra notes 178–84 and accompanying text.
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stress and anxiety that accompanies the contemplation of death.201 Furthermore, by impressing on testators the importance of their decisions
and by relieving some of the anxiety of preparing an estate plan and
creating a will,202 the will-execution ceremony can improve testators’
decision-making processes. The positive psychological effect of the willexecution ceremony is therefore one of the estate-planning process’s therapeutic qualities.203
D. Testamentary Self-Expression
An additional therapeutic aspect of estate planning is the testator’s
opportunity for self-expression.204 An estate plan is inherently expressive. By preparing an estate plan and implementing that plan through the
execution of a will and other estate-planning documents, testators communicate to their friends, family, and community how they would prefer
to dispose of their estates.205 Moreover, testators can also express their
thoughts, feelings, and emotions through their desired plans of distribution.206 This type of self-expression often takes the form of a testamentary bequest, in which the act of giving, not the testator’s words, is the medium of self-expression.207 For example, the testator can express love by
giving a close friend or relative a portion of his or her estate, just as Ishmael did when he bequeathed his entire estate to Queequeg, his trusted

201. See supra notes 185–92 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text.
203. Beyer, supra note 39, at 420 (“A proper ceremony, coupled with sensitive and tactful
counseling by the attorney during the entire estate planning process, may make it easier for clients to
cope with the inevitability of death.”); Shaffer, supra note 14, at 382 (“Data . . . indicate[] that willpreparation actually reduces fear of death and has a constructive or even therapeutic effect on death
anxiety.”).
204. Baron, supra note 49, at 648–49 (“To the extent that a will is an expression of autonomy
and self-determination, what it can be expected to communicate is the testator’s unique and personal
ideas . . . .”); Brashier, supra note 173, at 63 n.1 (“[T]he will is far more likely than most informal
will substitutes to reveal unique aspects of the testator’s personality.”).
205. Baron, supra note 49, at 650 (“The testator cannot carry out his own commands, but instead is dependent on others to read the will and put its commands into effect. The testator thus must
by necessity write for others.”).
206. Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic
Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 61 (2009) (“Wills have an expressive function and tell the
story of the testator; a will can express love or anger, or disgust or praise. The will gives permanent
voice to the testator’s wants.”); Hacker, supra note 140, at 979 (“[A] bequethal encompasses the
giver’s preferences, decisions, and personality, as well as possibly reflecting the recipients’ gratitude, disappointment, remembrance, and, hopefully, respect for the giver’s choices and wishes.”).
207. Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask To Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a
Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1224 (1990)
(“[G]iving expresses love.”); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Death, Taxes and Family
Property, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 1, 3 (1977) (noting it is argued that giving and
bequeathing express affection).
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friend and fellow crewmate.208 In addition to expressing positive emotions through their testamentary schemes, testators can express negative
feelings by excluding certain individuals from their estate plans, such as
a disfavored child209 or an unloving spouse.210 Regardless of whether the
testator’s expressed feelings are positive or negative, the expression of
these emotions through testamentary gifts can be an act of great satisfaction.211
Another type of self-expression that is communicated through an
estate plan and that can provide satisfaction to the testator is the opportunity to shape one’s posthumous reputation. While alive, many people are
concerned about how the public perceives them, and they derive contentment from projecting a particular identity to society.212 Consequently,
many people “employ various and sundry strategies to highlight, and
even to edit, aspects of their identities, signaling how they wish others to
perceive them,”213 such as wearing a certain style of clothing or driving a
particular make of car. Similarly, the exercise of testamentary power can
also serve as an important self-expressive tool that can shape one’s public perception.214 Indeed, by providing for certain individuals, institutions, or causes in their estate plans, testators can make one last attempt
to mold their public perceptions.215 Just as the testator receives pleasure
from making others happy through testamentary gifts, the act of shaping
one’s posthumous reputation through the substance of an estate plan can
be therapeutic for the testator.
The creation of the Nobel Prizes by a bequest of Alfred Nobel illustrates how an estate plan can shape posthumous reputation and provide

208. See MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 248.
209. See Paul T. Whitcombe, Defamation by Will: Theories and Liabilities, 27 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 749, 752 n.14 (1994) (describing a mother’s will that left a nominal sum to two daughters
because “of their unfilial attitude toward a doting father”).
210. See, e.g., Brown v. Du Frey, 134 N.E.2d 469, 470–71 (N.Y. 1956) (involving a wife who
disinherited her husband and who explained in her will that she “[did] so intentionally because of the
fact that during [her] lifetime he abandoned [her], made no provision for [her] support, treated [her]
with complete indifference and did not display any affection or regard for [her]”).
211. “When a testator bequeaths to persons, the satisfaction she derives from the transfer . . . stems from what the economists, in their inimitable fashion, dub an interdependent utility
function: Making her loved ones happy also makes the testator happy.” Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests
For Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 52–53 (1999). In the case of disinheritance, the testator can similarly take satisfaction from making unhappy those whom he dislikes.
212. Id. at 53.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 53–54 (“An estate plan can serve as the final move in this social game, communicating to survivors how individuals prefer to be remembered.”).
215. See id. (adding that through “[b]equests to persons . . . a testator might hope to win posthumous recognition as a devoted parent, a benevolent employer, [or] a loyal friend,” and explaining
further that “bequests for social purposes [are] far more flexible, allowing a testator to define her
character with precision”).
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satisfaction to the testator. Nobel was a chemist, inventor, and manufacturer whose work involved various explosives, including nitroglycerine,
a highly volatile and combustible compound.216 Inspired by the death of
his younger brother Emil in an explosion at one of his family’s plants,217
Nobel developed a technique of stabilizing nitroglycerine by mixing it
with earth from the banks of a nearby river thus making the explosive
safer to transport and use.218 Although he originally considered the name
“Nobel’s Safety Powder,” Nobel’s invention eventually became known
as dynamite.219
Like the death of Emil—which contributed to Nobel’s development
of dynamite—the loss of Nobel’s older brother Ludvig as a result of a
heart attack provided the impetus for another of Nobel’s most noteworthy legacies.220 When media coverage of a death within the Nobel family
emerged, one newspaper erroneously reported that Nobel himself had
died and ran a highly critical obituary that described Nobel as the “merchant of death.”221 Roused by this unique glimpse at his posthumous reputation, Nobel aimed to reshape his public perception, and his chosen
means to do so was through his estate plan.222 As one biographer described, “[Nobel] became so obsessed with his posthumous reputation
that he rewrote his last will, bequeathing most of his fortune to a cause
upon which no future obituary writer would be able to cast aspersions.”223 The cause to which Nobel bequeathed not only the bulk of his
fortune but also his family name is known as the Nobel Prizes, which

216. See KENNE FANT, ALFRED NOBEL: A BIOGRAPHY 93 (1991).
217. See id. at 62.
218. See id. at 93–94.
219. See id. at 134.
220. See id. at 207.
221. Id.; see also ROY J. HARRIS JR., PULITZER’S GOLD: BEHIND THE PRIZE FOR PUBLICSERVICE JOURNALISM 35 (2007) (“[S]ome French newspapers mistakenly reported Nobel’s demise
after they confused him with his brother Ludvig. ‘Le Marchand de la Mort Est Mort,’ one paper
proclaimed: ‘The Merchant of Death is Dead.’”).
222. See MICHAEL EVLANOFF, THE LONELIEST MILLIONAIRE 7 (1969) (“He would draw up a
plan that would convince the nations of the world that the real Alfred Nobel cherished above all
these three: Love, learning and compassion.”); FANT, supra note 216, at 266 (“In order to calm his
conscience, he created his Nobel Prizes.”); RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE
RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 87 (2010) (“[I]t was reputedly the erroneous publication of
an obituary that prompted Alfred Nobel to establish his eponymous charitable foundation.”).
223. FANT, supra note 216, at 207. But see CRAIG SILVERMAN, REGRET THE ERROR: HOW
MEDIA MISTAKES POLLUTE THE PRESS AND IMPERIL FREE SPEECH 169 (2007). Specifically, Silverman quoted “a senior curator at the Nobel Museum in Sweden” as saying,
It would be interesting to find the first mention of the obituary being one reason for Alfred Nobel’s decision to form a Prize, but so far we have only found rather late statements that this should be the case. So far we have to conclude that this is only one among
many rumors that tend to grow around famous historical persons.
Id.
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annually rewards individuals who make notable contributions to the
fields of science, literature, and world peace.224 The creation of the Nobel
Prizes through the terms of his estate plan provided Nobel with peace of
mind of knowing that dynamite’s devastation would not be his sole enduring legacy.225
Although the expressive quality of the testator’s preferred distributional scheme may be somewhat implicit, the testator’s self-expression
can also take on a more explicit form. Specifically, testators can use the
words of their estate-planning documents to directly express their feelings and emotions.226 Like the expression of emotions through the act of
giving, testamentary self-expression through words can relate to both
positive and negative feelings. For example, testators who feel a particular fondness for a close friend or family member can include words of

224. The Nobel Prizes, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
225. FANT, supra note 216, at 218 (“It must have given [Nobel] certain satisfaction to formulate his will the way he did.”).
226. Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 379,
380–81 (2011) (“Often the final significant written communication by its author, a will has the potential to be a monument—or indeed a testament—to the decedent’s loved ones, to express her vision for the future or her version of the past.”).
The will of Ludwig van Beethoven illustrates that a will can serve as a self-expressive tool. Beethoven, the great German composer and pianist, feared that his worsening deafness would impede
his musical career, and as a result of his illness, he experienced severe despair and thoughts of suicide. See LEWIS LOCKWOOD, BEETHOVEN: THE MUSIC AND THE LIFE 118–21 (2005). With these
concerns in mind, the composer traveled to the small Austrian town of Heiligenstadt in hope that
seclusion would prove therapeutic. See ALEXANDER WHEELOCK THAYER ET AL., THAYER’S LIFE OF
BEETHOVEN 303 (10th ed. 1991). His time there not only influenced his future compositions but also
inspired Beethoven to draft his will. See LOCKWOOD, supra, at 121–22 (drawing connections between the Heiligenstadt Testament and Beethoven’s later work). Known as the Heiligenstadt Testament, Beethoven’s will bequeathed his entire estate to his two brothers and extensively described the
psychological turmoil that he experienced as a result of his deafness. See TIM BLANNING, THE
TRIUMPH OF MUSIC 99–100 (2008).
In his will, Beethoven recalled instances in which others heard music and sounds that he could
not, and he described the intense emotions evoked by these occurrences. As he recounted, “[W]hat a
humiliation for me when someone standing next to me heard a flute in the distance and I heard nothing or someone heard a shepherd singing and again I heard nothing.” LOCKWOOD, supra, at 119.
Beethoven’s condition placed him on the brink of suicide, as the composer described, “Such experiences brought me close to despair; a little more of that I would have been at the point of ending my
life.” Id. Similarly passionate descriptions of Beethoven’s anguish fill the text of the Heiligenstadt
Testament.
Fortunately, the expression of these thoughts and feelings in his will proved therapeutic for Beethoven. BARRY COOPER, BEETHOVEN 130 (2000) (“Beethoven’s decision to reject suicide and overcome his feelings of despair by writing them down [in the Heiligenstadt Testament], can be seen as a
turning point in his life.”); CHARLES P. MITCHELL, THE GREAT COMPOSERS PORTRAYED ON FILM,
1913 THROUGH 2002 17 (2004) (“Simply expressing his deepest thoughts [in the Heiligenstadt Testament] had a therapeutic effect for the composer.”). As one historian described, “Beethoven’s sheer
act of writing the Heiligenstadt Testament . . . seems to have granted its author the will to go on with
life, turning even the defeat of deafness into a victory of will.” ALESSANDRA COMINI, THE
CHANGING IMAGE OF BEETHOVEN: A STUDY OF MYTHMAKING 76 (2008).
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love, affection, or gratitude in their wills.227 Conversely, testators who
feel wronged by a family member or other acquaintance can express disgust or detestation through their testamentary words.228
The benefit that all testators can experience as a result of this form
of testamentary self-expression is exemplified by the recent trend of estate-planning practitioners and trusts-and-estates scholars recommending
that testators include more expressive language in their estate-planning
documents.229 For example, some scholars suggest that testators prepare
ethical wills along with their other estate-planning documents.230 An ethical will is not a legal document governing the disposition of the testator’s property.231 Instead, an ethical will is a separate document that
serves as “a very personal form of communication” that is used “to
share . . . values, important life lessons, wisdom, [and] family history
with loved ones.”232 The preparation of an ethical will encourages careful
self-reflection, including consideration of the author’s life experiences,

227. See, e.g., Dykes v. Dykes, 741 S.W.2d 256, 256 (Ark. 1987) (“My children know that my
wife and I love them dearly, and I am certain that they realize that she will dispose of any property
of mine in a manner which is consistent with the love and affection we feel for the children.”).
228. Whitcombe, supra note 209, at 749. Whitcombe states,
For hundreds of years, the dead have taken advantages of a unique and singular opportunity to avenge themselves upon the living. Despite the sage advice that says “men should
not sin in their graves,” the dead have reached out from beyond the grave to insult those
who offended them in some way during life.
Id.
229. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 226, at 381; Hacker, supra note 140, at 980.
230. See, e.g., David Gage et al., Holistic Estate Planning and Integrating Mediation in the
Planning Process, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 509, 531 (2004); Zoe M. Hicks, Is Your (Ethical)
Will In Order?, 33 ACTEC L.J. 154 (2007); Steven Keeva, A Legacy of Values, 91 A.B.A. J. 88
(2005); Suzanna de Baca, Ethical Wills: How to Add Morals to Estate Planning, FAMILIES IN BUS.,
Nov./Dec. 2007, at 62.
231. See Hicks, supra note 230, at 154–55 (explaining nature and history of ethical wills).
Specifically, Hicks noted,
Ethical wills date back thousands of years and seem to have roots in the Bible itself. Old
Testament patriarchs conveyed the ideals closest to their hearts, motivating values, and
events in their life’s experiences before they passed away . . . . Although Biblical ethical
wills were in the mode of “Now gather around, children, because I have something to tell
you before I leave this earth,” modern ethical wills are almost always written (and occasionally video-taped). Modern ethical wills are usually found in one or more letters written to the family and kept with traditional wills.
Id.
232. Lewis D. Solomon & Lewis J. Saret, Ethical Wills: Adding Values to the Estate Plan,
D.C. EST. PLAN. COUNCIL EST. PLAN. NEWSL., Fall–Win. 2005, at 7, http://www.lewissaret.com/201
0/03/ethical-wills-a.html; see also Hicks, supra note 230, at 154 (explaining that “[e]thical wills can
include many things, such as the wisdom, values, and beliefs of a parent or grandparent, their purposes for certain actions taken, expressions of love and affection, hopes and blessings for the family,
exhortations to carry on charitable work, or to care for certain relatives,” and that “[t]hey can include
reminders of heritage, expressions of gratitude, and statements of spiritual belief”).
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morals, and beliefs, as well as relationships with friends and family,233
and it can provide great satisfaction to the author.234 Indeed, “[e]thical
wills help clients engage in a profoundly significant process by putting
down what really matters to them and help give them a feeling that
they’re doing something eminently worthwhile.”235 This form of testamentary self-expression and its therapeutic effects, however, need not be
confined to a separate ethical will, as the testator’s expressive language is
often included in the testator’s traditional estate-planning documents.236
In addition to the satisfaction derived directly from the act of preparing an ethical will or including expressive language in other estateplanning documents, testamentary self-expression can be therapeutic for
the testator because the testator’s emotionally expressive statements often ease familial conflict during the administration of the estate.237 As
discussed previously, testators may worry that their estate plans will
cause tension between surviving family members.238 But this antitherapeutic consequence of estate planning can be diminished by the inclusion
of expressive language in the testator’s estate plan that explains the reasoning behind seemingly inequitable bequests.239 This form of selfexpression shows the testator’s careful consideration regarding estateplanning decisions, and it can bolster respect for the testator’s wishes
among disappointed heirs.240 Testamentary self-expression therefore has
therapeutic potential for the testator because it can reduce the likelihood
of familial conflict.

233. BARRY K. BAINES, ETHICAL WILLS: PUTTING YOUR VALUES ON PAPER 2 (2d ed. 2006)
(“I strongly believe that those who wish to reflect on and share life’s experiences will find an ethical
will a useful tool.”); Gage et al., supra note 230, at 531. (explaining that in an ethical will, the testator “describe[s] the people, values, and experiences that have meant the most to them and of which
they want their children to be aware”).
234. See BAINES, supra note 233, at 26–27 (explaining that “writing an ethical will adds a
transcendent dimension to our presence on this planet by providing a link to future generations,” and
adding that “[i]t is a way to transform values and beliefs into a legacy, which may well be accompanied by a profound sense of satisfaction, completion and continuation, all at the same time”).
235. Keeva, supra note 230, at 88 (adding that the exercise of creating ethical wills makes the
authors realize that “they have something to offer, namely new meaning and purpose in their lives”);
see also MARY POLCE-LYNCH, NOTHING LEFT UNSAID: CREATING A HEALING LEGACY WITH FINAL
WORDS AND LETTERS 26 (2006) (“When I finished writing it, I felt an incredible peace of mind
[and] a sense of accomplishment . . . .”).
236. Ronald Chester, The Psychology of Dead Hand Control, 43 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
505, 505 (2008) (“This document can be separate from the will, or the language can be incorporated
in a formal will or other document disposing of property.”); Hicks, supra note 230, at 162 (“Many
ethical wills are woven into traditional wills.”).
237. See Gordon, supra note 226, at 409–10; Timothy P. O’Sullivan, Family Harmony: An All
Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 253, 308–09
(2007).
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. See O’Sullivan, supra note 237, at 308–09.
240. See id.
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Whether a testator’s self-expression is contained in an ethical will
or a more traditional estate-planning document, testamentary selfexpression can be psychologically beneficial for the testator. “By encouraging testators to add greater expression—be it descriptive detail,
explanation, narrative, or statements of individual philosophy to their
wills—we allow those testators to define themselves, to think mindfully
about death, and to take control of their personal legacies.”241 This opportunity for self-expression therefore stands alongside the freedom of
testation,242 the role of the estate-planning attorney,243 and the ritualistic
nature of the will-execution ceremony244 as a therapeutic aspect of the
estate-planning process.
V. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: MILITARY WILLS
Once the positive and negative psychological consequences of the
law have been identified,245 the second step of a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis is to use the framework established in the first step of the
analysis to identify ways to maximize the law’s therapeutic potential.246
To demonstrate how this second step can be applied in the context of
estate planning, this Part examines a particularly specialized aspect of the
estate-planning process: the execution of wills by soldiers and sailors.
The application of the therapeutic jurisprudential framework to the law
governing military wills suggests that certain reforms of the law of succession would maximize the overall therapeutic potential of the law. Furthermore, by illustrating the potential for therapeutic jurisprudence to
serve as an insightful analytical tool, an analysis of the law governing the
wills of soldiers and sailors demonstrates that the therapeutic jurisprudential framework should be applied to other aspects of the estateplanning process, as well as more broadly to other areas of the law of
succession.
A. The Privileged Status of Military Wills
Normally, the will-execution process can be difficult because the
law mandates that the testator comply with various formalities to validly
execute a will.247 In all American jurisdictions, these formalities general
241. Gordon, supra note 226, at 428.
242. See supra Part IV.A.
243. See supra Part IV.B.
244. See supra Part IV.C.
245. See supra Parts III–IV.
246. See Schultz, supra note 30, at 54.
247. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 226 (warning that “these basic requirements for
execution of wills vary considerably in detail from state to state”).
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ly require that a will be written, signed by the testator, and attested by at
least two witnesses.248 Other formalities are also required in some states.
For example, some jurisdictions require that the testator and the attesting
witnesses be in each others’ presence during the will-execution ceremony.249 Other formalities include publication, where the testator must announce to the attesting witnesses that the document before them is the
testator’s will,250 or subscription, where the testator must sign at the end
of the document.251
Under certain circumstances, the law in some jurisdictions reduces
these formal burdens for testators performing military or maritime service.252 For example, the English Wills Act of 1837 provides that “any
soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being
at sea, may dispose of his personal estate as he might have done before
the making of this Act.”253 As this provision illustrates, the general prerequisite for the reduced formality of military wills is that the testator be
in “actual military service” or “at sea.” The specifics of this requirement
vary from state to state, with some states restricting the application of the
provision to military personnel serving during a time of formally declared war and other states construing the actual military service requirement more liberally.254

248. See id.
249. See id. at 233.
250. See id. at 243 n.12.
251. See id. at 237.
252. See Patricia Critchley, Privileged Wills and Testamentary Formalities: A Time to Die?, 58
C.L.J. 49, 49 (1999); Steven F. Lancaster, Probate and the Military: What’s It All About?, 85 MIL.
L. REV. 5, 12–13 (1979).
253. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Wm. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 11 (Eng.). Several U.S. states have similar
provisions. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 6 (2011) (“A soldier in actual military service or
a mariner at sea may dispose of his personal property by a nuncupative will.”); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 551:15 (2011) (“A soldier in actual military service, or a mariner or seaman when at sea,
may dispose of his movables and personal estate as he might heretofore have done.”); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14 § 7(a) (West 2011) (“The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a soldier in actual
military service, or a mariner or seaman at sea, from disposing of his or her wages or other personal
estate as he or she might otherwise have done.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-53 (West 2011) (“[A] soldier being in actual military service, or a mariner or seaman being at sea, may dispose of his personal
estate as he might heretofore have done . . . .”).
254. See Lancaster, supra note 252, at 13; see also Nowell D. Bamberger, Are Military Testamentary Instruments Unconstitutional? Why Compliance with State Testamentary Formality Requirements Remains Essential, 196 MIL. L. REV. 91, 125 n.174 (2008). For instance, New Jersey has
held that a soldier who has embarked to join his unit in active combat is in actual military service.
See In re Knight’s Estate, 93 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1952). But Rhode Island does not apply the privilege to
mariners embarked as passengers on vessels traveling through a war zone en route to take command
of another vessel. See Warren v. Harding, 2 R.I. 133 (1852). In some states, a Soldier’s will is only
privileged if executed in fear of impending death. See, e.g., In re Hickey’s Estate, 184 N.Y.S. 399
(Sur. Ct. 1920). But see Ray v. Wiley, 69 P. 809 (Okla. 1902). (Other states have no such requirement.).
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In addition to variations regarding the actual military service requirement, states differ in the extent to which the formal burdens of will
execution are reduced for military personnel.255 Some states authorize
oral wills for soldiers and sailors, thereby eliminating the need for the
testator to write and sign a testamentary document.256 Other states require
a written document but eliminate the requirement that the will be attested
by witnesses.257 Still more variation exists in the limitations placed on the
type and amount of property that can be distributed pursuant to the relatively informal wills of soldiers and sailors.258 For example, most states
limit the property passing via an informal military will to personal property not exceeding a specified value.259 But at least one state permits a
soldier to distribute an unlimited amount of both personal and real property by the terms of an informal military will.260
Several explanations for the reduced formality of military wills
have been proposed.261 But the traditional rationale is that men and women on the battlefield and at sea lack the opportunity and means to comply
with the traditionally required formalities.262 As the New York Supreme
Court for New York County explained:
[T]he utter inability, oftentimes, to find the time or the means to
make a deliberate and written testamentary disposition of their effects, seem, at all times, to have made [the wills of soldiers and sailors] a proper exception to the operation of a rule, which the wisdom of later times, has found it expedient, if not absolutely obligatory, to apply to all others.263

Thus, the law in some jurisdictions grants the wills of soldiers and sailors
a privileged status by recognizing them as validly executed wills despite
noncompliance with the ordinarily required formalities.

255. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 125.
256. See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191, § 6 (2011) (“A soldier in actual military
service or a mariner at sea may dispose of his personal property by a nuncupative will.”).
257. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 125; see also MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-103
(West 2011) (“A will entirely in the handwriting of a testator who is serving in the armed services of
the United States is a valid holographic will if signed by the testator outside of a state of the United
States, the District of Columbia, or a territory of the United States even if there are no attesting witnesses.”).
258. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 125.
259. See id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.025 (2011) (limiting oral wills by military
personnel to the disposition of personal property not exceeding $1,000).
260. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-21 (2011).
261. See Critchley, supra note 252, at 53–55.
262. See Tobias Weiss, The Formalities of Testamentary Execution by Service Personnel, 33
IOWA L. REV. 48, 52 (1947) (“The service will has been shorn of the usual formal requirements, it
has often been stated, because the service testator lacks the qualified sources of advice and the opportunities for making formal wills enjoyed by the non-service testator.”).
263. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Barb. 148, 155 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851).
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B. The Therapeutic Consequences of the Privileged Status
Despite the pervasive traditional explanation of the privileged status
of military wills, a secondary justification may also explain the relatively
informal method of will execution provided to service personnel.264 Although combat preparedness requires a proper level of morale, the hazardous surroundings of the battlefield can diminish a soldier’s psychological well-being. Like Ishmael, who endured the perilous conditions
aboard the Pequod, military personnel at war face a dangerous reality in
which the thought of death is never far from their minds.265 The law may
therefore provide service personnel a relatively easy method of will execution, in part because the execution of a will can bolster morale by improving the psychological state of the testator. This boost in morale may
in turn contribute to the overall combat effectiveness of the troops.266
This therapeutic rationale recognizes that the wills of soldiers and
sailors enjoy a privileged status because military personnel have limited
opportunity to reap some of the psychological benefits of the estateplanning process. First, soldiers at war are unlikely to have access to an
attorney who can assist them with the estate-planning process.267 Consequently, an estate-planning attorney has a limited ability to serve as a
therapeutic agent for active-military personnel.268 Second, as the traditional justification of the privileged status also recognizes, soldiers and
sailors often lack the time and means to complete the will-execution ceremony.269 As a result, during the course of active service, military per
264. See Critchley, supra note 252, at 55 (“It could be argued that it is important for morale to
allow members of the armed forces, who are acutely aware of the risk of their death, to make provision for that event in whatever manner best suits them.”); Weiss, supra note 262, at 48 (“The leaders
of the armed forces regard it as a factor contributing to the maintenance of proper morale and consequent combat effectiveness, to provide those forces with an adequate channel and opportunity for
making a testamentary disposition.”); see also Bamberger, supra note 254, at 119 (suggesting that
federal legislation governing military-testamentary instruments “could be characterized as tending to
the psychological readiness of Soldiers during deployment”); Edwin A Wahlen, Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Wills: A Proposal for Federal Legislation, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 702, 709 (1948) (proposing
federal legislation governing the wills of military personnel that would “enhance the morale of
troops”).
265. See Critchley, supra note 252, at 55 (explaining that service personnel are “acutely aware
of the risk of their death”); Weiss, supra note 262, at 48 (“In war, the common hazards of life are
magnified and multiplied by subtle and ingeniously effective instruments of devastation developed
by the unloosed imagination of a mankind mobilized for massacre.”).
266. For example, Weiss, writing at the end of World War II, stated that “[o]f great[] contemporary significance is the official organized interest of the armed forces . . . in the frame of mind or
morale of their members,” and “the effect on that state of mind of the assurance that, regardless of
the restraints circumstances may impose, the power of testamentary determination will nevertheless
be preserved, is deemed not inconsequential.” Weiss, supra note 262, at 53.
267. See id.
268. See supra Part IV.B.
269. See Weiss, supra note 262, at 52.
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sonnel have a reduced opportunity to benefit from the positive psychological consequences of the will-execution ceremony.270
Conversely, the privileged status of military wills increases the opportunity for military personnel to benefit from the other therapeutic consequences of the estate-planning process—namely, the psychological
benefits of testamentary freedom271 and self-expression.272 Indeed, by
reducing the formal burdens of will execution, such as eliminating the
need for armed-service members to locate witnesses for attestation, the
law makes it easier for military personnel to exercise testamentary freedom and to express love and affection for friends and family through
testamentary bequests. A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis therefore
suggests that because military personnel have a diminished opportunity
to enjoy the therapeutic consequences of consulting an estate-planning
attorney and completing the will-execution ceremony, the law provides
these testators with a greater opportunity to experience the psychological
benefits of testamentary freedom and self-expression.
C. Evaluating Reforms of the Law of Military Wills
The therapeutic rationale of the privileged status of military wills is
analytically valuable because it can be used to evaluate potential reforms
of the law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors. For example, in
recent decades, the number of states bestowing a privileged status upon
military wills has dwindled.273 In 1979, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had laws that reduced the formal requirements of military wills.274 But by 2008, the number of American jurisdictions granting
this privileged status had dropped to nineteen.275
Based on this trend, one potential widespread reform is simply to
eliminate the privileged status, thereby mandating that the same formal
burdens apply to the wills of both soldiers and civilians. But when analyzed from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspective, the merits of this
reform are lacking. Because the privileged status increases the likelihood

270. See supra Part IV.C.
271. See supra Part IV.A.
272. See supra Part IV.D.
273. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 124–25.
274. See Lancaster, supra note 252, at 60–62 (listing Alabama, Alaska, California, the District
of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and West Virginia as the American jurisdictions that conferred a privileged status to military wills in
1979).
275. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 124–25. Between 1979 and 2008, Alabama, Alaska,
California, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Texas removed the
privileged status of military wills. See id. at 124 n.170.
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that certain military personnel will experience the therapeutic consequences of estate planning when they otherwise would have little opportunity to do so,276 the elimination of the privileged status reduces the
overall therapeutic potential of the estate-planning process. Thus, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis suggests that the privileged status of
military wills should be maintained.
Another potential reform is to limit the application of the privileged
status. Indeed, because several jurisdictions broadly construe the activemilitary-service requirement,277 some military personnel reap the benefits
of the privileged status despite not facing the dangers of active war, having both access to legal assistance and ample opportunity to comply with
the formalities of will execution.278 Therefore, one way to limit the application of the privileged status would be to narrow the active-militaryservice requirement by limiting the privileged status to the wills of testators who truly lack the opportunity and means to comply with the traditional will formalities.
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of this reform suggests that
restricting the application of the privileged status would increase the
law’s therapeutic potential. Unlike the complete elimination of the privileged status, a more robust active-service requirement would maintain
the privileged status for those testators who are unable to enjoy the therapeutic consequences of completing the will-execution process. By contrast, military personnel who have an opportunity to comply with the traditional will formalities would be required to do so, as they would have
the ability to reap the full psychological benefit of the will-execution
ceremony.279 As a result, limiting the application of the privileged status
of military wills would increase the law’s overall therapeutic potential.
Thus, a therapeutic jurisprudential analysis suggests that maintaining the privileged status of military wills and more strictly applying the
active-service requirement would maximize the law’s therapeutic potential. But therapeutic jurisprudence does not necessarily demand that the
law should be shaped in this way.280 Indeed, therapeutic jurisprudence
acknowledges that a number of policy considerations should be included
in the analysis of legal reform.281 Instead of mandating the most therapeutic result, therapeutic jurisprudence simply proposes that therapeutic
considerations be evaluated alongside other policy considerations.282

276. See supra Part V.B.
277. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
278. See Critchley, supra note 252, at 55–56.
279. See supra Part IV.C.
280. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.

2012] A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning 467
With respect to the reform that eliminates the privileged status of
military wills, no other policy considerations appear to have been considered by the state legislatures that adopted the reformed rules.283 In fact,
the elimination of the privileged status has generally been part of larger
reforms of each state’s probate code, and no careful analysis of the policy considerations underlying the privileged status of military wills seems
to have been undertaken before such reforms were adopted.284 That is not
to say that no legitimate policy considerations support the abolishment of
the privileged status. In fact, proponents of reform have argued that
modern military personnel have ample means and opportunity to execute
formal wills and as such the privileged status is not needed.285 But policymakers in the states that have eliminated the privileged status do not
appear to have relied upon this policy consideration when implementing
the reform.286
Conversely, legitimate policy considerations appear to drive the
reform movement with respect to the narrowing of the active-service requirement. For example, proponents may urge the adoption of the reform
out of concern that a lax active-service requirement undermines the primary purpose of testamentary formality; namely, ensuring that the will
accurately and reliably reflects the testator’s true testamentary intent.
Indeed, if an informal will reflects testamentary intent less reliably, then
the privileged status should be limited to those testators who will actually
benefit from the privileged status.
Therefore, as the analysis of both reforms illustrates, therapeutic jurisprudence simply suggests that therapeutic consequences should be
considered together with other policy considerations during the legalreform process. In some cases, a variety of policy considerations will
trump therapeutic concerns, but in other instances, therapeutic jurisprudence will illuminate the necessity for reform.
D. Applying the Framework Beyond Military Wills
As the analysis of the law governing the wills of soldiers and sailors
demonstrates, the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning developed in this Article can provide fresh insights into the law of

283. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 124–25.
284. Id. (“Little evidence explains this phenomenon, except that many of these provisions were
repealed in the context of adopting the UPC (which does not include such a provision) or recognizing holographic wills (which may have been seen as an effective substitute).”).
285. See Critchley, supra note 252, at 57 (explaining that “the call made by many writers for
the abolition of the privilege as an unjustifiable anachronism may [be] attractive” because “it appears
that the privilege is now rarely invoked, which in fact suggests that the privileged testators are having no significant problems with the ordinary . . . formalities”).
286. See Bamberger, supra note 254, at 124–25.
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succession and can serve as a valuable analytical tool for evaluating proposals for legal reform. But the therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of
military wills only begins to realize the full analytical potential of therapeutic jurisprudence as applied to the law of succession. Indeed, the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning can be used to analyze a wide array of laws that affect testators’ psychological well-being
as they navigate the estate-planning process.
For example, the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate
planning can be used to analyze the nonprobate system. In recent decades, the will’s place in the estate-planning process has diminished, and
the prevalence of a variety of nonprobate transfers such as life insurance
and revocable trusts has increased.287 Nonprobate transfers, however,
generally have fewer formal requirements and typically require less legal
assistance than traditional wills.288 But as the therapeutic jurisprudential
framework of estate planning suggests, both the estate-planning lawyer
and the will-execution ceremony have therapeutic qualities.289 Therefore,
because the rise of the nonprobate system likely affects the overall therapeutic potential of the estate-planning process, a comprehensive therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of the nonprobate revolution is warranted
and may illuminate potential areas of reform.
Likewise, a number of other areas of estate planning raise issues for
which therapeutic jurisprudence can serve as an important analytical tool.
For example, in recent years, scholars have proposed either adding or
eliminating various restrictions on testamentary freedom. Professor Terry
Turnipseed suggests abolishing the forced spousal share,290 which traditionally provides a portion of the decedent spouse’s estate to the surviving spouse regardless of the terms of the will.291 Turnipseed therefore
argues for the expansion of testamentary freedom. Conversely, Professor
Deborah Batts suggests placing a new restriction on testamentary free
287. Langbein, supra note 101, at 1108. Langbein states,
Probate, our court-operated system for transferring wealth at death, is declining in importance. Institutions that administer noncourt modes of transfer are displacing the probate
system. Life insurance companies, pension plan operators, commercial banks, savings
banks, investment companies, brokerage houses, stock transfer agents, and a variety of
other financial intermediaries are functioning as free-market competitors of the probate
system and enabling property to pass on death without probate and without will.
Id.
288. Id. at 1116 n.34 (“[S]ome people who are uneasy about dealing with lawyers and legal
formality may be more comfortable in the attestation-free, fill-in-the-blank world of the mass will
substitutes . . . .”).
289. See supra Part IV.C–D.
290. See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to
Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the
French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 770–92.
291. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 476–77.
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dom—namely, a forced heirship for the testator’s children.292 Whereas
the law of wills traditionally permits testators to omit their children from
estate plans,293 Batts argues that under certain circumstances the testator’s children should receive a mandatory portion of the estate regardless
of the terms of the parent’s will.294 Both of these proposals raise issues
that therapeutic jurisprudence is well-equipped to address. Indeed, because the therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning suggests that testamentary freedom positively affects the testator’s psychological well-being,295 therapeutic jurisprudence can provide a unique
perspective on reform proposals that either expand or restrict testamentary freedom.
In addition to analyzing how the estate-planning process affects the
psychological well-being of the individual testator, therapeutic jurisprudence can also be used to analyze other aspects of the law of succession.
For example, the process of administering the decedent’s estate can have
psychological consequences for the decedent’s friends and family.296
Therapeutic jurisprudence can therefore shed light on how to alter the
probate process so as to minimize the system’s negative psychological
impact on the decedent’s loved ones.297 As previously discussed, one of
the few contexts in which therapeutic jurisprudence has been explicitly
applied to the law of succession is the proposal to implement a mediation
process to settle estate disputes and thus positively affect the psychological well-being of the testator’s family.298
Finally, therapeutic jurisprudence can also be used to analyze areas
of the law of succession that have psychological consequences that extend beyond the testator or the decedent’s friends and family. For instance, the default distributional scheme of intestacy, which directs the
estate to the decedent’s family members in the absence of a will,299 can
have psychological consequences for broad segments of the population

292. See Batts, supra note 207, at 1253–63. Other scholars have made similar proposals. See,
e.g., Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 170–
72 (1994); Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499,
519–20 (1964).
293. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 65, at 519–20.
294. See Batts, supra note 207, at 1254–55.
295. See supra Part IV.A.
296. See Wisnom, supra note 34, at 1354–56.
297. See id. at 1358–61.
298. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
299. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQUALITY 1,
27 (2000) (“Intestacy statutes attempt to distribute a decedent’s property to the decedent’s family,
either because the intestacy statute strives to approximate the decedent’s wishes or because society
has decided that intestacy statutes should benefit and strengthen families if a decedent does not express a contrary wish in a will.”).
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because intestacy statutes are viewed as signaling societal approval or
disapproval of certain relationships.300 The exclusion of some familial
relationships, such as same-sex domestic partners, from triggering rights
of property distribution in the absence of a will therefore stigmatizes and
diminishes the value of these relationships.301 But the inclusion of samesex partnerships and other currently unrecognized familial relationships
in the default distributional scheme of intestacy would signal societal
approval of such relationships, and would produce positive psychological
consequences for those involved in these relationships.302
These examples illustrate possible applications of the therapeutic
jurisprudential framework to the law of succession and the potential of
therapeutic jurisprudence to serve as an insightful analytical tool. The
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of estate planning developed in
this Article can be used to analyze a variety of estate-planning issues,
and therapeutic jurisprudence can be applied more broadly to all areas of
the law of succession. Indeed, because the law of succession operates
within a variety of emotionally charged contexts, such as the estateplanning and probate processes,303 therapeutic jurisprudence is particularly equipped to aid the study of the law of succession. Until now, the relevance of therapeutic jurisprudence to the estate-planning process has
largely been ignored.304 Aiming to spur widespread therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of the law of succession, this Article has developed a
therapeutic jurisprudence framework of the estate-planning process and
demonstrated therapeutic jurisprudence’s broad analytic potential.


300. Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession Purposes, 34 ACTEC L.J. 171, 172 (2008) (“[I]ntestacy statutes serve an expressive function, indicating
society’s view of who ‘counts’ as a family member.”); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999) (explaining that, because intestacy statutes do not recognize same-sex relationships, “they devalue[] gay
men and lesbians and their relationships”).
301. See Gary, supra note 299, at 72 n.482; Spitko, supra note 300, at 1064.
302. See Gary, supra note 299, at 72 n.482 (arguing that intestacy laws should be reformed to
further “[a] policy of supporting the family,” which includes “not only the economic spoils of the
decedent’s estate, but also the psychological support that comes with being recognized as a family
under the law”). This type of argument has been applied in support of other legal reform proposals.
See, e.g., F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 561, 580 (“[R]ecognizing same-sex marriage would place a seal of societal approval on homosexual relationships.”); Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting
Children Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 778 (2010) (arguing that recognition
of a cohabiting-parent evidentiary privilege “would signal that same-sex relationships . . . are worthy
of greater societal respect”).
303. See Winsom, supra note 34, at 1354.
304. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A therapeutic jurisprudential analysis reveals that the estateplanning process can be an unsettling experience because testators must
contemplate their own mortality.305 But the analysis also suggests that
completing an estate plan and “facing the inevitability of death . . . can
have many psychological rewards.”306 Indeed, “the ‘estate planning’ experience is one way the client can be helped in his personal reconciliation
to death.”307 Several aspects of the estate-planning processes contribute
to the overall therapeutic nature of the testamentary experience, including the doctrine of testamentary freedom, the counsel of an estateplanning attorney, the ritualistic nature of the will-execution ceremony,
and the opportunity for testamentary self-expression.308
Although the therapeutic potential of estate planning seems apparent, the process’s psychological consequences have largely been overlooked. As a result, a longstanding opportunity to apply therapeutic jurisprudence to the estate-planning context has generally been ignored.
Seeking to seize this opportunity and spark widespread therapeutic jurisprudential analysis of the law of succession, this Article has developed a
therapeutic jurisprudential framework of the estate-planning process.309
As the examination of the privileged status of military wills illustrates,310
this Article’s framework can be used to analyze a broad spectrum of estate-planning issues, and can ultimately provide fresh insights into the
merits of potential legal reform in areas such as nonprobate transfers,
testamentary freedom, estate administration, and intestacy.311
In sum, the process of preparing and implementing an estate plan is
potentially both unsettling and psychologically rewarding. But as this
Article demonstrates, therapeutic jurisprudence can serve as an insightful
analytical tool to evaluate the law of succession and to bolster the overall
therapeutic potential of the estate-planning process. Ishmael’s experience
of executing a will in the midst of Captain Ahab’s search for the Great
White Whale312 exemplifies estate planning’s therapeutic potential. After
finalizing his estate plan following a near-fatal encounter at sea, the sailor described his state of mind: “I looked round me tranquilly and contentedly, like a quiet ghost with a clean conscience sitting inside the bars

305. See supra Part III.A.
306. Beyer, supra note 16, at 778–79.
307. Schaffer, supra note 14, at 378.
308. See supra Part IV.
309. See supra Parts III–IV.
310. See supra Part V.A–C.
311. See supra Part V.D.
312. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text.
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of a snug family vault.”313 After his testamentary experience, Ishmael
was poised to face confidently the dangerous realities of his current surroundings.314 Like Ishmael, all testators can receive contentment from the
preparation and implementation of an estate plan. Legal scholars and policymakers should therefore use this Article’s therapeutic jurisprudential
framework to evaluate potential reforms of the law of succession to ensure that the estate-planning process is a source of comfort and satisfaction for those preparing for the inevitability of death.


313. MELVILLE, supra note 5, at 249.
314. Id. (“Now then, thought I unconsciously rolling up the sleeves of my frock, here goes for
a cool, collected dive at death and destruction, and the devil fetch the hindmost.”).

